Why is it in Greece’s best interests to strengthen ties with Türkiye?

The sixth Türkiye–Greece High-Level Cooperation Council in Ankara, marked by Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s visit and multiple cooperation deals, represented more than a symbolic diplomatic gesture.

The meeting this week indicated that both countries are committed to preserving a workable framework of cooperation and expanding collaboration in areas such as investment, maritime trade, economic cooperation, earthquake preparedness, culture, science, and technology.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emphasised after the talks that disputes between the two neighbours are “solvable,” reinforcing Ankara’s preference for dialogue. 

Athens’ stance indicates it also recognises the importance of handling disagreements while increasing areas of agreement.

This approach is not driven by goodwill alone, but by strategic necessity, experts say.

Visne Korkmaz, an international relations professor at Istanbul’s Nisantasi University, tells TRT World that the transformation currently underway in transatlantic security has significantly altered Athens’ calculations.

“The political and strategic cost of adopting an overtly anti-Ankara posture has increased,” she says, pointing to Türkiye’s growing visibility and weight within NATO’s evolving deterrence architecture. 

And as the United States recalibrates its approach to European security—seeking greater burden-sharing while remaining anchored to NATO—European allies are expected to enhance their defence contributions.

“In such an environment, Türkiye’s military capabilities gain renewed strategic value,” Korkmaz says.

Europe’s regional realities

According to an international relations academic at Middle East Technical University, Oktay Firat Tanrisever, Greece’s calculations are shaped by a shifting strategic environment. 

As a NATO member, Athens would face higher costs within the Alliance framework if tensions with Ankara escalated into any confrontation. 

He also notes that Washington values dialogue with Türkiye across multiple regions — from the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean — reinforcing the perception in Athens that prolonged polarisation with Ankara would receive limited backing from the current US administration.

“Both the United States and the European Union expect Greece to remain in constructive relations with Türkiye,” Tanrisever tells TRT World. 

Within this broader context, Tanrisever argues that Greece’s push for cooperation with Türkiye is driven largely by strategic necessity.

At a time when Europe is reassessing its security architecture, Türkiye’s role in European security has become increasingly important.

Countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain have expressed interest in strengthening ties with Ankara. 

“Greece does not currently possess wide latitude to draw European states into an overt anti-Türkiye polarisation,” Korkmaz says.

Moreover, the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean remains fluid. 

Regional alignments—whether involving the European states, or North African actors—are constantly evolving. 

In such an environment, for Greece, sustaining rigid polarisation risks diplomatic isolation rather than strategic advantage, experts say.

Domestic Strategic Pragmatism

Beyond international pressures, domestic realities also shape Athens’ approach. 

Greece’s economy still needs stability, and increased tensions with Türkiye could lead to real economic consequences, analysts say.

The tourism industry, in particular, benefits from peaceful bilateral relations.

“The Prime Minister’s visit and the agreements signed show that both countries wish to maintain a reasonable basis for cooperation,” Tanrisever says.

In his assessment, avoiding escalation is necessary for Greece’s own national interests.

Korkmaz notes that while Greece has historically followed what she calls a “mini-state strategy”—internationalising disputes with Türkiye and using third-party deterrence—it is now combining this approach with hedging.

“There are no significant gains in triggering an arms race or provoking Ankara,” she emphasises. 

“If Greece wants to ensure that Türkiye remains in a position of strategic self-restraint, cooperation and confidence-building must be foregrounded.”

Taken together, the Ankara meeting suggests that Athens recognises the limits of confrontation in a rapidly evolving security order. 

Strengthening ties with Türkiye is not just a diplomatic preference—it's a strategic decision shaped by transatlantic expectations, European realignments, and domestic economic realities.

The transatlantic security shift, Europe’s pursuit of a new strategic balance, and Greece’s economic sensitivities have reduced the scope for escalation while increasing the incentives for careful cooperation. 

For Greece, the positive agenda emerging from Ankara is less a tactical pause and more a strategic necessity shaped by the realities of a changing regional and global order.