Shield of the Americas: The US security strategy for Latin America

In recent years, Latin America has diversified its international relationships. The expansion of trade with Beijing and the consolidation of platforms like the China-CELAC Forum have contributed to a more pluralistic environment. 

This process is now starting to extend into areas long dominated by the United States, including security—a development that has sparked a reaction in Washington.

On March 7, the US launched the Shield of the Americas, a grouping of Latin American governments aligned with President Donald Trump’s administration to coordinate actions against cartels, gangs, and transnational criminal networks. 

Presented as an urgent response to regional violence and insecurity, the initiative also reflects an attempt to restructure hemispheric security cooperation.

While the initiative reflects the political style of the second Trump administration and its focus on alliances among like-minded governments, Shield of the Americas does not emerge out of nowhere. 

Regional cooperation against drug trafficking and organised crime has been a recurring pillar of inter-American diplomacy for decades.

Since the First Summit of the Americas in Miami (1994), the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime became central to hemispheric cooperation.

This drive led to the creation of multilateral assessment mechanisms and increasing judicial coordination among countries. 

One example is the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism, established after the Second Summit in Santiago (1998) to track each country’s progress in combating drugs through peer reviews. 

The idea was simple: criminal networks operate regionally, so regional responses are necessary.

In the early 2000s, the agenda expanded: the Third Summit in Quebec (2001) linked security and democracy defence against emerging threats. 

The extraordinary Summit in Monterrey (2004) introduced the concept of multidimensional security, integrating terrorism and organised crime. 

And the Fifth Summit in Port of Spain (2009) strengthened regional cooperation against gangs, illicit trafficking, and transnational criminal networks.

However, these initiatives maintained a key feature of Pan-Americanism: inclusivity. The summits of the Americas were conceived as forums where all hemispheric governments could debate and coordinate policies, even amid deep political differences.

In this sense, the latest summit in Doral represents a significant shift. 

The new format does not seek to bring all countries together but rather a subset, making cooperation more selective and, in a way, more instrumental.

Selective coalitions in hemispheric cooperation

Selective cooperation had been developing for years. During Trump’s first term, US-Latin America relations were managed primarily through bilateral meetings and agreements with countries willing to coordinate specific agendas with Washington. 

One example was Growth in the Americas (2019), launched to promote energy and infrastructure investments with governments seeking closer economic ties with the US.

The trend became more visible at the 2022 Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, when the Biden administration chose not to invite Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, signalling that some hemispheric initiatives were increasingly limited to willing administrations.

Shield of the Americas deepens this logic, now applied to security, while raising significant political and operational questions. 

The Doral Declaration, signed by defence ministers, is notably limited: it establishes no permanent mechanisms, funding, or clear procedures for regional coordination. 

Its broad programmatic language allows political flexibility but reduces the ability to translate the initiative into concrete policies. Analysts warn that such coalitions often repeat past patterns of weak institutions and uncertain outcomes.

One should understand that the Shield of the Americas does not stem from the pan-American spirit of cooperation but from a vision aimed at reaffirming Washington’s primacy in the hemisphere, as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy. 

In his Doral statement, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth noted that external powers are trying to reshape the region by promoting “a sort of a new ‘Global South’ that excludes the US and other Western nations but includes non-Western powers and other adversaries.” 

From the Pentagon’s perspective, the Global South—where China is actively positioning itself—represents a hemispheric challenge, explaining the concept of reinforcing the immediate security perimeter through a ‘Greater North America’ to contain extraregional powers.

China’s security cooperation proposal

Over the past two decades, ties between Beijing and Latin America have grown steadily—not only in trade but also in financial, technological, institutional, and even migratory areas. 

This engagement is now extending into security. The sequence of the 2022 Global Security Initiative (GSI), the fourth China-CELAC Forum (CCF) in 2025, and China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Third White Paper, late 2025) illustrates a gradual strategy.

The GSI serves as a doctrinal framework, establishing security principles grounded in sovereignty, non-interference, and cooperation to address transnational threats. 

While it did not explicitly mention drug trafficking, it included it within the broader transnational crime agenda. 

Building on this conceptual foundation, the CCF’s fourth meeting documents proposed to “explore modes of cooperation…in combating the production, consumption and trafficking of controlled drugs” under police and law enforcement between China and Latin America. 

The Third White Paper went further, suggesting not just “exploration” but “jointly combating non- traditional security threats such as cross-border crimes and terrorism,” and to “deepen counter-narcotics cooperation, and jointly combat drug smuggling”.

However, this proposal faces limitations. Security cooperation is still nascent and lacks an institutional architecture comparable to the inter-American system. 

It also lacks consolidated frameworks, accumulated experience, and operational networks equivalent to decades of hemispheric development. 

Nevertheless, the speed with which this agenda has emerged demonstrates Beijing’s intent to position itself as a security partner for Latin America.

The cancellation of the 2025 Summit of the Americas in the Dominican Republic lends added significance to the Doral meeting. 

It not only filled the gap left by that summit but became the first multilateral meeting with Latin American heads of state convened by Washington during Trump’s first and second administrations.

Past imperfect, future uncertain

In South America, the failed PROSUR gathered politically aligned governments with weak institutions and immediate objectives. 

Shield of the Americas seems to extend that logic to the hemispheric level: Trump’s announcement even mentions an Americas Counter Cartel Coalition “to operationalise hard power to defeat these threats” but without defining mechanisms, rules, or clear procedures. 

The analogy to PROSUR suggests a coordination platform based on ideological alignment rather than a solid regional architecture.

For Latin America, the scenario becomes more complex. 

While the initiative still lacks institutional foundations and defined resources, it introduces new pressures to align with Washington—even as it seeks to limit cooperation with China—and creates additional divides with countries excluded from the initiative.