Oil’s well that ends well? How Trump’s obsession is playing out in Venezuela and Iran

“Lately, politics very often smells of oil, and oil smells of politics.” - Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, 20th-century Soviet politician

When the then-unknown Donald Trump placed a newspaper ad in 1987 criticising American policy in the Middle East, the world didn't yet know it was witnessing the birth of an obsession. 

“The world is laughing at America's politicians as we protect ships we don't own, carrying oil we don't need, destined for allies who won't help,” the young New York magnate wrote at the time.

Nearly 40 years have passed, but for Trump, time seems frozen somewhere in the era of the 1973 oil embargo. 

Returning to the White House for his second term in 2025, the 79-year-old president still thinks in terms of the last century, when black gold determined the fate of empires and control over oil fields was synonymous with geopolitical power.

Seizing foreign oil for America's presumed benefit has been Trump's longtime obsession.

He grew up in the 1950s and '60s, when American automobiles dominated world markets, and the country's oil companies controlled most of the world's richest deposits.

Since then, Trump has harboured an intense nostalgia for the era of Cadillacs, Fords, and oil prosperity—a nostalgia for America's former "greatness".

Oil idée fixe

"I would take the oil," Trump said about Iraq in 2011. "I would not leave Iraq and let Iran take the oil." 

That same year, discussing Libya, he was even more straightforward: "I am only interested in Libya if we take the oil."

"Take the oil" became the mantra of his first presidential campaign and first term. 

"It used to be, 'To the victor belong the spoils,'" Trump complained in 2016. "I always said, 'Take the oil.'" 

As president, he insisted on keeping American troops in Syria for exactly this reason. "I like oil," he stated in 2019. "We're keeping the oil."

But if Iraq, Libya, and Syria were conflicts inherited from predecessors, Venezuela is quite another matter. This is Trump's first full-fledged oil adventure of his own making.

On January 3, crack American troops captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife in an operation in Caracas. 

Days later, Trump announced that the U.S. would "run the country" to get its oil. "We're in the oil business," the president declared. 

"We're going to have our very large United States oil companies ... go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, and start making money."

Venezuela has the world's largest proven oil reserves—more than 300 billion barrels. That's more than Saudi Arabia.

For Trump, this is "black gold" that simply needs to be pumped from the ground.

Reality, however, proved far more complex than the president's expectations. 

When Trump gathered the heads of major oil companies at the White House on January 10, expecting to hear promises of $100 billion in investments, disappointment awaited him.

ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods was bluntly frank: "We have had our assets seized there twice, and so you can imagine to re-enter a third time would require some pretty significant changes." He added: "Today it's uninvestable."

Trump reacted sharply. "I didn't like their response," he told reporters. "I'd probably be inclined to keep Exxon out" of Venezuela.

The problem isn't just political risk. Oil prices are currently around $60 per barrel—a four-year low. 

At this price, Venezuelan oil, which is a heavy grade requiring complex refining, is simply unprofitable. Analysts estimate that doubling Venezuelan production would require more than $100 billion in investment and years of work.

The Iran factor

While the Venezuelan adventure stalls, Iran—another oil power experiencing crisis—has come into Trump's crosshairs. 

Mass protests erupted in the country in late December amid economic collapse. According to human rights activists, more than 2,500 people have died.

"Iranian Patriots, keep protesting - take over your institutions,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on January 13, parts of the post in all-caps in his usual style. "I have cancelled all meetings with Iranian officials until the senseless killing of protesters stops. Help is on the way."

The next day, he was even more specific. 

"I haven't heard about the hanging. If they hang them, you're going to see some things ... We will take very strong action if they do such a thing," Trump threatened in response to questions about possible executions of protesters. 

Asked about his "end game" for Iran, the president replied simply: "The end game is to win. I like winning."

Oil prices immediately reacted. On January 14, Brent jumped 2.5 percent to $65.47 per barrel. 

The market understands: Iran, unlike Venezuela, is a major producer, pumping about 4 million barrels per day. Any destabilisation there—or, even more so, American airstrikes—could lead to a sharp price spike.

But Trump doesn't care about these concerns. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has already announced that American oil producers are ready to help "stabilise" Iran if the clerical regime falls. 

And Elon Musk's SpaceX has made Starlink satellite internet access free for Iranians—so they can coordinate protests.

Trump's logic

The irony is that the shale revolution has made the US the world's largest oil producer—nearly 14 million barrels per day. 1973 is long gone, and oil is no longer America's Achilles' heel. 

America no longer depends on imports as it did during the oil embargo, the memory of which so traumatised Trump.

Moreover, the world is moving toward peak oil demand, expected by the end of this decade. 

Renewable energy sources are becoming increasingly competitive. While the US bets on fossil fuels, China is building its future on solar and wind energy—inexhaustible resources.

Yet Trump's oil strategy has its own logic. Control over Venezuelan oil isn't just about money. It's about power.

As Henry Kissinger said: "Control oil and you control nations; control food and you control the people."

According to JPMorgan estimates, the combined reserves of Venezuela, Guyana (where American companies dominate), and the US itself could give Washington control over approximately 30 percent of global reserves. 

This is a colossal lever of influence, especially regarding China, which imports enormous volumes of oil.

This shift could give the US greater influence over oil markets, potentially keeping oil prices within historically lower ranges, enhancing energy security, and reshaping the balance of power in international energy markets.

For Russia, whose economy critically depends on oil exports, this is also a problem. Low oil prices limit Moscow's ability to finance military operations. Venezuelan barrels on the market will add pressure to Russia's already sanctions-battered oil industry.

Another clear loser from American control over Venezuela is Cuba. 

For decades, the ‘Island of Freedom’ has survived thanks to Venezuelan oil, which Caracas supplied on preferential terms. 

The loss of this energy source puts Havana in a critical position. For Trump, this is an additional bonus: the opportunity to strangle an old US adversary 90 miles from Florida by doing nothing—simply turning off the oil tap.

By creating a National Energy Dominance Council, opening protected Alaskan lands and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for oil and gas development, accelerating pipeline construction and refinery expansion, Trump is betting on the past.

At the same time, he has rolled back subsidies for electric vehicles and solar panels, halted offshore wind energy citing "national security," and once again withdrew the US from the Paris Climate Agreement.

"What Trump is betting on is becoming the world's largest and last petrostate," writes Politico. "China is betting on becoming the world's largest and lasting electrostate. Which side would you rather be on?"

But for the US president, whose worldview was formed during the era of oil shocks, the choice is obvious. "We're in the oil business," Trump repeats like a mantra. And it seems he intends to stay in this business—at all costs.

The question is whether oil companies, which increasingly look not to the past but to the future, where oil plays an ever-smaller role, will want to follow him. 

While the president dreams of Venezuelan and Iranian "black gold," American business calculates risks and profits—and increasingly concludes that the game isn't worth the candle.