Will the US attempt to seize Greenland be detrimental to NATO’s cohesion?

US President Donald Trump’s renewed push to acquire Greenland from Denmark has escalated from bombastic rhetoric to real threats, including tariffs on European allies and hints of military use.

The US has framed its interest in Greenland in strategic terms, like access to mineral resources and stronger defence against China and Russia. 

Yet the conflict has raised questions about the unity and future of NATO, a military alliance between 30 European and two North American countries under which an armed attack against one nation is considered an attack against all.

Since its founding in 1949, NATO has successfully protected some of the militarily weak nations of Europe from aggression by outside powers. Türkiye currently has the largest military in the alliance after the US.

Trump's interest in Greenland, the world’s largest island and an autonomous territory of Denmark, dates back to 2019 when he first floated the idea of purchasing it. 

As president-elect in 2024, Trump called the “ownership and control” of Greenland an “absolute necessity” for the US. 

His rhetoric intensified last year, with the appointment of Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as a special envoy to Greenland. White House officials have refused to rule out military options, with Trump’s homeland security adviser Stephen Miller asserting that “nobody is going to fight the United States over the future of Greenland”.

European leaders have unequivocally opposed the US proposal to take over Greenland. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has warned that a US takeover of Greenland would mark “the end of NATO”.

Denmark has also proposed a NATO Arctic mission to counter US pressure, emphasising continued dialogue but rejecting any sale.

Amid these developments, the US is expected to cut roughly 200 positions in NATO command centres, halving its personnel in key entities overseeing military and intelligence operations. 

Analysts interpret this as a shift in resources towards the Western Hemisphere, exacerbating European anxieties about the US commitment to NATO.

NATO versus Russia’s expansionism

One critical question is whether US actions signal NATO’s weakness to Russia, potentially emboldening Moscow to accelerate expansions in Eastern Europe or the Arctic.

Richard Outzen, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, cautions against overinterpreting the Greenland saga as a greenlight for Russian aggression.

“That would be a hasty conclusion,” he tells TRT World.

“One could argue that perceived divisions within NATO might tempt Moscow to bully the Baltics or other states in Eastern Europe. But in my view, they see US resolve as the far greater variable in the deterrent equation,” he says. 

Outzen emphasises that if Russian President Vladimir Putin fears impulsive US retaliation, he is less likely to tempt fate through rash action.

For Outzen, Trump's intentions outweigh intra-alliance friction, as US nuclear and conventional forces are “by far the preponderance of NATO's capabilities”.

Rick Fawn, an international security specialist who teaches at the University of St Andrews in the UK, tells TRT World that the discord must be a “total delight” to the Kremlin.

“I doubt, however, that it can encourage Russia to undertake more territorial acquisitions,” he says, pointing to the challenges that the Russian military has been facing in Ukraine.

But Yasar Sari, director of the Haydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at Istanbul’s Ibn Haldun University, sees a more profound impact of Trump’s pursuit of Greenland.

Sari tells TRT World that Russia interprets US interest in Greenland not as a localised real estate deal, but as a “symptom of NATO's fragility” and a return to Cold War mentality.

Moscow views Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” – which he describes as justifying coercion against allies like Denmark – as evidence that the rules-based order of post-World War II has collapsed into a transactional, might-is-right era, Sari says.

This has emboldened Russia to accelerate its own territorial ambitions, exploiting a “strategic blind spot” created by Western discord.

"By mirroring the American logic of ‘security through annexation’, Russia aims to normalise its expansionism, transforming the Arctic and Eastern Europe into arenas where military power, rather than international law, dictates the possession of the world's remaining strategic resources,” he says.

Undermining NATO's cohesion

Many observers have asserted that the US pursuit of Greenland despite collective European opposition erodes NATO's unity, potentially leading to reduced cooperation.

Outzen remains optimistic though.

“NATO will survive the Trump presidency for sure,” he says.

In fact, he credits Trump with strengthening the alliance in a roundabout manner.

“In some ways, he has helped the alliance, notably through boosting defence spending and emphasising hard power after several decades of European laxity,” he says.  

Drawing historical parallels, Outzen notes that NATO endured France's withdrawal from the unified military command during the Cold War.

Outzen says nations might pull out of military command in the worst-case scenario, but stay politically engaged. However, he says its chances are “very low”.

Instead, he expects NATO members to grit their teeth and wait for the next US presidential election.

Fawn acknowledges damage to NATO, but hopes that it will be temporary.

“This is undermining NATO, but we all have to hope that this is short-lived and will be remembered as an almost comic quirk of history,” he says.

On a positive note, Fawn also observes increased European cooperation because of this discord. 

“We are already seeing more cooperation and even interoperability among European NATO allies, including for acquisitions and for operations,” he says. 

This trend, accelerated by Ukraine and now Greenland, is fuelling “European cooperation within NATO but without the US”.

On the question of NATO surviving Trump’s presidency, Fawn is cautiously positive.

“In my view, NATO is likely to survive.” 

“It may not be as active and it may not be able to take core decisions,” he says, while pointing to NATO’s consensus-based structure.

Fawn insists that US military planners recognise that they already have access to Greenland, and antagonising European allies outweighs gains.

For Sari, the Greenland conflict presents a “terminal” crisis for NATO.

By threatening Denmark's sovereignty, the US has “inverted” the logic of NATO’s Article 5, which makes it obligatory for every member to help an ally that comes under armed attack, he says.

While NATO may “technically survive” the Trump presidency, the alliance is likely to emerge as a “hollowed-out shell”, where military cooperation is replaced by transactional coercion and unilateral American demands, Sari says.

He highlights Europe's military tech dependence on American software, satellites, and missile defence systems. 

This creates a “geopolitical trap”, where Europe endures pressure while building autonomy, praying the Trump era ends before irreversible damage, he says.

Is direct military confrontation possible?

For the first time in decades, the spectre of armed conflict among Western allies looms large. 

Yet the experts largely dismiss it as improbable, though not without caveats.

Outzen is unequivocal in asserting that there is “zero chance” of NATO allies deploying forces against each other over Greenland.

He explains that Trump does not want to use military force. “He is engaged in bullying to force a better negotiating concession on what amounts to a political and economic deal,” he says.

Fawn says that US forces might even refuse unlawful orders in the highly unlikely case of a direct military confrontation.

“US personnel can object to orders that they find illegal, and in this case US commanders would surely recognise that there was no threat, that no actions were taken against them and that the deployment was against decades-old allies,” he says.

“No, I do not see a direct military confrontation,” Fawn says.

While the prospect of a traditional hot war between the US and Denmark remains remote, Sari says the situation has already devolved into what military analysts call a “grey zone” confrontation.

He warns that even a “peaceful” takeover via coercion would erode trust.

“It would effectively transform NATO from a voluntary alliance of equals into a protection racket, proving to Europeans that their sovereign borders are only as secure as Washington’s current interest allows,” he says.