Russia-Ukraine war: Why peace remains elusive even after four years?

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” on February 24, 2022, he had hoped for a swift and decisive victory over Ukraine, given Moscow’s superior firepower.

Four years later, the mighty Russian army is still battling to overcome the dour Ukrainian resistance – which had managed to stave off wave after wave of attacks from land and air. 

Though Russia has managed incremental battlefield gains, the Ukrainian forces have forced Moscow to a grinding war in eastern and southern Ukraine, home to a sizable Russian-speaking population. 

The four-year war, described as Europe's biggest military engagement since WWII, has led to enormous casualties on both sides. Though the numbers are contested, Russia is said to have recorded 325,000 fatalities, including civilians, compared to Ukraine’s 140,000. 

In total, Moscow has 1.2 million casualties in its military ranks, double the number of Ukraine’s wounded and dead. But war continues to drag on despite the tremendous losses on both sides. 

And several rounds of talks and other peace initiatives have failed to end the war.

According to analysts, it is unlikely to end anytime soon. 

The warring sides are “stuck” in an unenviable position, with both Russia and Ukraine seeking to exhaust each other’s manpower by recruiting more people to the war front, says Yasar Sari, a scholar of the Haydar Aliyev Eurasian Research Centre at Ibn Haldun University.  

As the war grinds on, the two sides face increasing mobilisation problems, even as the harsh reality of the military confrontation is taking its toll on both Russian and Ukrainian populations, Sari says. 

Why, then, have both states not pursued peace more aggressively despite global calls for a negotiated settlement? 

“They can’t agree on land concessions (demanded by Russia from Ukraine)...More importantly, both sides can not reach an understanding on Ukraine’s political identity, which is tied to what type of security umbrella the country will be under,” Sari tells TRT World. 

While Ukraine has been demanding an urgent ceasefire, Russia wants a comprehensive deal that addresses its security concerns before ending the war.

Sari believes that one of the most thorny issues of the peace talks centres around Ukraine’s status – will it align with the West or Russia, or can it remain neutral?

Moscow’s war was triggered in part by Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO, which the Kremlin feared would bring the transatlantic military alliance right to its doorsteps.

For Kiev, joining NATO had become imperative to avoid exactly what is transpiring now – a Russian invasion.

“Ukraine does not want to lose its current Western-oriented political direction and possible security arrangements with the West at the expense of a peace deal with Russia, which turns the country into a bleak buffer zone between Europe and Russia,” Sari adds. 

American and Russian experts, however, have different takes on why peace remains elusive despite enormous suffering on both sides. 

Russia does not want peace because it wants to “eliminate Ukraine as an independent country,” says Matthew Bryza, a former US diplomat to Azerbaijan, a country which was once part of the now-defunct Soviet Union. 

“Ukraine can not surrender to Russia’s maximalist demands,” Bryza tells TRT World, referring to land concessions Moscow seeks from Kiev. 

But Sergei Markov, a former Putin advisor and Russian academic, sees the pro-Western Ukrainian leadership under Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the main obstacle to achieving meaningful peace. 

Since the “anti-Russian” so-called Orange Revolution of 2014, the Western bloc wanted to use the current Ukrainian leadership to penetrate into Russian territory, Markov tells TRT World. 

“Kiev adapted policies which amount to persecution of Russian-speaking people across the country.” 

Is time on Russia’s side? 

Experts also believe that Russia, which seems to mobilise more manpower than Ukraine, might calculate that a dragging war can benefit Moscow more than Kiev. This means war might be a better option for Russia than peace to reach its political objectives. 

“There are some signs the Russians are not recruiting as much, but they are still recruiting more than the Ukrainians,” said Maj. Gen. Pekka Turunen, the chief of Finland’s military intelligence, hinting that time might be on Moscow’s side. 

Linas Kojala, head of the Geopolitics and Security Studies Centre in Vilnius, agrees.

“Russia still believes time can be weaponised,” Kojala tells TRT World. 

“Moscow’s objectives remain maximalist – control over Ukrainian territory, limits on Ukraine’s sovereignty, and a redefined European security order – and there is little evidence it is ready to trade those aims for a durable compromise.” 

Despite Russia’s firm stance and actions, the West is divided and continues to debate the size and speed of support to Ukraine, which “reinforces the Kremlin’s expectation that endurance pays,” says Kojala.  

The political analyst also draws attention to the fact that the current battlefields demonstrate the features of a war of attrition in which industrial capacity and political will matter as much as military tactics on the ground. 

“Russia is trying to convert manpower, production, and a rising tempo of long-range strikes into gradual territorial gains and psychological pressure. Ukraine is fighting to hold the line, preserve statehood, and stay connected to Western support – because certain capabilities, especially intelligence and high-end systems, are not easily substituted,” he adds. 

While Moscow has made gains against Kiev, it took control of less than 1 percent of Ukrainian lands last year, according to estimates, which shows that the Russian march is both slow and difficult. 

In four years, Russia has been able to occupy a fifth of Ukrainian territory. 

“The fact that Russia currently occupies less territory of Ukraine than in August 2022 proves that Russian aims are not being realised, in spite of heavy casualties,” Kojala says. 

Can’t bet high!

Though US President Donald Trump has tried to play peacemaker, he faces a problem related to his own deal-making style in which he usually opens a game by betting high and aiming to reach a better agreement with his counterpart, according to Sari. 

But in the Ukraine war, this tactic does not work because Trump can not bet high against Moscow, which has a more advantageous situation compared to Kiev, he observes. 

Throughout 2025, Trump repeatedly put forward different peace proposals, including a 28-point peace plan, and even met Putin a couple of times and held several lengthy phone conversations with him to try to pacify the Russian leader. 

But the Russians have not been persuaded by Trump’s approach, says Markov. 

“It is like Trump is trying to sell a not very profitable business to Russia and Moscow says, ‘No, just give it up to us’,” Markov says, describing US-Russia negotiations. 

Markov also believes that Europe is effectively blocking any proposal to turn into an agreement because Western leaders – from British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Metz – face far-right populist opposition at home. 

“They want to use the military hysteria as a fear factor against their own populations to keep themselves in power,” says the Russian analyst, referring to Europe’s establishment parties, which champion more arms and financial support to Ukraine. 

“At the moment, there is really nothing to stop this war. With Western support, Ukraine under the Zelenskyy regime can continue this war for years while Russia, which sees this confrontation as existential in its nature, keeps fighting to the very end.” 

Other experts also see the military hysteria in Europe as an important factor for the failure of the peace efforts, but they assess a different reason for its emergence across the continent. 

According to Sari, European leaders have been opposing the US President's peace proposals, saying that they favour Russia and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. Europeans also fear that if Russia has its way in Ukraine, Moscow might next turn its attention to neighbouring EU states, he adds. 

“Europeans do not want Ukraine to turn into a buffer zone between Russia and the West because they believe that Moscow might stamp its control over such a state with an unclear identity,” he says. 

Other experts also think that neutrality – like Austria’s position – might not be a viable option for Ukraine. Finland, a former neutral state with a long border with Russia, also joined NATO recently following the Ukraine war. 

“Neutrality could be an option, but it is not a magic formula – it works only when the security environment allows it and when it is backed by credible guarantees. In Ukraine’s case, ‘neutrality’ has often meant something else: constraints on sovereignty, limits on defence, and an external veto over alliances – precisely the conditions that invite renewed coercion,” Kojala says. 

“Without hard guarantees and enforcement, neutrality would be a pause, not a solution,” he adds.