US jets down: Are Chinese experts offering online guidance for Iran’s precision strikes?

Amid the reports of Iran shooting down a number of American warplanes over the past two weeks, a parallel development has been drawing significant attention on social media: a surge of highly technical, China-origin content explaining how such feats might be achieved.

One such case involves a Chinese social media account, laohushuoshijie01 (“Lao Hu Talks About the World”), which published a detailed tutorial on March 14 outlining how an F-35 Lightning II could potentially be detected and targeted using relatively low-cost systems.

The video, which included Persian subtitles, quickly went viral across Chinese and Iranian social media ecosystems, garnering millions of views.

According to reports, the individual behind the account studied at Northwestern Polytechnical University, a major Chinese defence research institution. 

"He appears to be a KOL (key opinion leader) followed by millions on social media platforms such as Douyin (Chinese version of TikTok) and WeChat," Shen Shiwei, a Beijing-based political analyst, told TRT World.

"He creates content on military affairs. As for his use of the Persian subtitles, it is likely aimed at attracting greater global attention and expanding his audience reach,” said Shen, the founder of China Briefing newsletter.

Five days after the video’s release, Iran claimed it had “seriously damaged” a US F-35 over central Iran — a claim denied by Washington — followed by the latest April 3 downing of an F-15E by Iran,  with both crew members subsequently rescued by US special forces. 

The timing of the  Chinese tutorial video has fuelled intense speculation over whether such content reflects coincidence, diffusion of knowledge, or a broader digital ecosystem increasingly shaping the character of modern warfare.

“His (laohushuoshijie01) content reflects personal views rather than any institutional position," Shen said, refuting speculation that such videos and posts could be part of something more structured.

However, some analysts caution against viewing this purely as spontaneous online behaviour. Tahir Mahmood Azad, research fellow at the University of Reading and a fellow at the Centre for International Security and Economic Strategy (CISES), argued that the phenomenon exists within a more structured information environment.

“This phenomenon should not be read as organic nationalism in isolation,” Azad told TRT World. “Content that reaches scale on Chinese platforms — particularly technical military analysis that favours an adversary of the United States — does so because it serves, or at minimum does not contradict, the prevailing state narrative.”

OSINT: Civilianisation of military knowledge

Since the US-Israeli attack on Iran triggered the war on February 28, Chinese online platforms have seen a surge of highly technical military analysis shared by users with backgrounds in engineering, aerospace, and computer science.

The activity appears largely informal and non-commercial, with engineers and STEM-trained users sharing tactical insights, simulations, and technical breakdowns of US military systems — including mapping American bases in the region, outlining missile strategies against aircraft carriers in the Gulf, and modelling defensive scenarios against a potential US landing on Iran’s Kharg Island. 

This content is typically speculative and circulated in open forums rather than formal defence channels.

In parallel, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has played a growing role. Across platforms like X, users have been sharing high-resolution satellite imagery of US bases in the Gulf, mapping aircraft deployments, air defence systems and naval movements in near real time. This content often combined commercially available satellite data with flight-tracking and maritime signals to reconstruct US force posture.

Chinese-linked platforms have often amplified this material, adding annotations and AI-enhanced visuals to interpret deployments across airbases, naval formations, and air defence systems.

This convergence of civilian expertise and accessible geospatial data reflects a broader shift in modern conflict: military-relevant knowledge is no longer confined to state institutions but increasingly generated and disseminated through decentralised, transnational digital networks.

Azad emphasised that the technical sophistication of such content suggests more than casual participation. “Detailed analysis of radar cross-sections, electronic warfare countermeasures, or drone vulnerability profiles is not the output of casual sentiment. It requires domain expertise… and a degree of coordination that casual online nationalism does not produce.”

Reza Khanzadeh, Professor of Middle East, Islam, and Politics at George Mason University, concurred with this view. “This support is structured,” he contended, suggesting that China–Iran relationship reflects a long-standing “mentorship-type partnership,” in which Beijing has historically helped Tehran develop tools of resilience — from information control to internal security management.

In his view, China’s assistance to Iran is best understood as “soft-assistance” — deliberately structured to avoid traceable, overt military cooperation. “Experts know that China is helping those civilians… but the presentation of their actions allows for deniability,” Khanzadeh said.

China Briefing’s Shen, however, maintained that there is no evidence of direct coordination. 

“So far, I am not aware of any credible evidence suggesting such activity. There is no clear indication that state or military institutions are supporting or encouraging this kind of content,” he said, adding that the trend appears largely spontaneous and reflects “a degree of sympathy toward a country that is perceived as being under illegal foreign attack.”

Is China’s BeiDou providing satellite navigation?

Alongside the surge in OSINT and civilian analysis, another key question is whether Iran’s improving strike accuracy is linked to Chinese technological support — particularly the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System.

Analysts have suggested that Iran may be integrating BeiDou into its missile and drone systems to enhance targeting precision and reduce vulnerability to GPS jamming. While these claims remain unverified, they are frequently cited as a possible explanation for improved battlefield performance and strike accuracy.

Azad argued that the significance of such support lies less in visible intervention and more in underlying infrastructure. “China’s support is structurally decisive even where it is deliberately invisible,” he said. “It has built and sustained the industrial and navigational infrastructure upon which Iran’s warfighting capacity depends.”

He pointed not only to supply chains of dual-use components — including microelectronics, gyroscopes, and missile precursors — but also to deeper forms of technological enablement.

The recent US allegations that China’s biggest semiconductor company SMIC has supplied chipmaking tools to Iran’s military-industrial complex, he noted, suggest a more systemic level of support — one that underpins Iran’s ability to domestically produce advanced guidance and communication systems critical for precision warfare.

“The claims are credible in structural terms,” Azad said. “BeiDou provides a sovereign-grade, sanctions-proof navigational and communications backbone that improves Iranian precision without requiring Beijing to make a visible decision in each engagement. The effect is real. The fingerprints are engineered to be absent.”

According to Azad, BeiDou’s architecture — including its short-message communication capabilities — enables real-time targeting updates and coordination without direct, attributable involvement from China.

Khanzadeh, on the other hand, maintained that if BeiDou or similar systems are contributing to Iran’s improved precision, the support is unlikely to take the form of direct battlefield coordination. Instead, he described it as “soft assistance” — including intelligence, data and strategic enablement designed to remain unattributable. “In other words, China does not want the help they are providing Iran to be traced back to them with irrefutable evidence.”

Shen, however, dismissed such claims. “From what I understand, Iran’s weapons systems are largely based on Russian designs… Technically speaking, it would not be easy to integrate Chinese systems like BeiDou into these existing platforms.”

China’s strategic posture

Chinese officials and analysts strongly reject any notion that Beijing is militarily involved in Iran’s war with the US and Israel. Gao Jian, professor at Shanghai International Studies University and visiting fellow at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Strategy and Security Studies, argues that Western interpretations often misread China’s strategic posture.

“China actually maintains a very normal bilateral relationship with Iran… China adheres to the principle of non-alignment and mutual benefit and mutual trust,” Gao said, stressing that Beijing doesn’t pursue a policy of “military alliance” with any country.

He added that framing China as part of an anti-Western military bloc reflects outdated geopolitical thinking: “These mentalities are absolutely trapped in Cold War ideology… China always sticks to the principle of not picking sides.”

According to Gao, China’s engagement with Iran co-exists alongside its relations with other regional actors, including the Gulf states, and should not be interpreted as military alignment.