As New START treaty expires, can US and Russia reach a new nuclear weapons pact?

During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race was one of the most frightening aspects of superpower rivalry, spreading fears worldwide that tensions between the US and the former Soviet Union could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. 

At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, as a sign of de-escalation between Washington and Moscow, the two powers showed mutual willingness to reduce their nuclear arsenals, signing several treaties to regulate their nuclear activities.

But the last nuclear control treaty between the US and Russia expired last week, raising fears of a new arms race. 

The treaty, known as ‘New START’ and signed in 2010, was one of the few agreements aimed at preventing a nuclear war. It limited both countries to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads.

Currently, no treaty is in force to regulate nuclear policy between the US and Russia, which together possess 90 percent of all nuclear weapons inventory. 

The New START Treaty replaced START I Treaty, which was signed between the US and Soviet Union in 1991 and entered into force three years later, remaining in force for 15 years. 

A comparable situation arose when START I expired in December 2009, following then-Republican President George W. Bush’s decision not to pursue a new agreement with Russia.

But under President Barack Obama, this brief interlude culminated in the signing of the New START Treaty in 2010 between the US and Russia, which was ratified nearly a year later securing the continuation of the nuclear de-escalation process between Moscow and Washington. 

While the New START expired in 2021, the Biden administration agreed to extend it for a five-year period, which ended last week. 

“Legally, New START could not be extended: it allowed only one five-year extension, and that was used in 2021,” Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, tells TRT World.

“There was a Russian proposal about informally abiding by New START’s numerical limits, but the US refused.”

Chinese factor 

The potential US rejection of continuing with New START caps is linked to both the Trump administration’s negative view of the Obama-era agreement and China’s remarkable rise in global affairs, as well as its projection to reach 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, according to experts. 

“Rather than extend ‘New START, a badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated, we should have our nuclear experts work on a new, improved, and modernised treaty that can last long into the future,” Trump wrote on Truth Social last week. 

Marco Rubio also recently stated that the American president wants to see China on board for a possible future agreement on nuclear weapons with Russia, but Beijing rejected this proposal as Moscow backed its Asian ally on this. 

“The United States is trying to determine how to address the rapid growth of China’s nuclear arsenal. Extending the treaty would effectively lock the United States into parity at around 1,500 deployed warheads not only with Russia, but also increasingly with China,” Juraj Majcin, a policy analyst, tells TRT World.

“This concern helps explain why Donald Trump has suggested the idea of a trilateral nuclear agreement that would include China.”

Due to China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal to become a nuclear power on equal footing with the US and Russia, Majcin is quite sceptical that Trump and Putin will reach an agreement on capping their nuclear forces. 

Other experts share similar assessments. 

Sokov, who has been involved in many arms control negotiations in the past, assesses a “very wide” gap between Russia and the US, and he is not sure that discussions, which “did not begin” yet, will really produce a treaty, projecting “a lengthy and difficult process”.

China “feels itself a superpower” and is clearly trying to build a reliable strategic nuclear deterrence “instead of the very minimalistic it used to have in the past,” he says. 

“How far they build is anyone’s guess. In principle, we need China on board, but when they decide they are ready, is anyone’s guess,” Sokov tells TRT World. 

Both China and Russia say that if nuclear talks are to be multilateral, as the Trump administration has stated, then France and the UK, the two European nuclear powerhouses, also need to be on board for such an agreement, as both are NATO members. 

France, a leading European Union member, which aims to be the continent’s atomic protector in the face of Russia’s repeated threats using nuclear language, refused to join a nuclear agreement.  

“America can't have limits on nuclear warheads & delivery systems with just Russia, for obvious reasons. China is as much of a threat to the US today as Russia was during the Cold War. If Putin cannot get Xi to also engage in a new nuclear treaty, I don't think America will agree to anything,” Edward Erickson, an American military analyst, tells TRT World.

“A corollary may be that the British and French warhead inventories would be counted with ours if China's are counted with Russia's,” Erickson tells TRT World, referring to a potential base for possible nuclear negotiations. 

Nuclear arms race? 

Due to both China’s and European nuclear powers’ unwillingness to join a nuclear deal, any negotiations on capping nuclear warheads and other capabilities are on unstable ground in the current situation, experts say. 

Beyond superpowers and old great powers like the UK and France, some 40 states also want to acquire nuclear weapons, according to reports. 

Is another nuclear arms race on the horizon? 

Oleg Ignatov, a specialist in Russian politics at International Crisis Group, is more hopeful that Moscow and Washington might achieve a similar bilateral nuclear accord “if they focus on what is achievable”.

But he also finds Chinese, British and French participation in such an agreement unrealistic.  

In the face of these complications, Ignatov notes that some power circles in Washington might see a potential global nuclear escalation as a better option for the US than a deal limiting the number of weapons of mass destruction. 

“Moscow really does not want a nuclear arms race that would call into question its nuclear potential, and because it is very expensive. Sometimes it seems to me that some people in the US now believe that such a race would be beneficial to their country,” Ignatov tells TRT World. 

Tactical nuclear weapons

In the absence of a treaty limiting nuclear weapons and regulating related activities between major powers, the status of tactical nuclear weapons becomes especially significant. 

Unlike strategic arms designed to strike an adversary’s homeland, these non-strategic weapons are short-range and intended for battlefield use.

Tactical nuclear weapons have included gravity bombs, short-range missiles, artillery shells, land mines, depth charges, torpedoes, and ground-based or shipborne surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air-to-air missiles. 

Tactical nuclear weapons were previously covered under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. 

The US withdrew from the agreement in August 2019, citing that "Russia has failed to comply with its obligations” and alleging that Moscow had begun deploying banned weapons.

“Any meaningful nuclear treaty between Russia and the United States would need to include limits on tactical nuclear weapons. Russia has been deploying such weapons, including in Belarus, and they pose a direct threat to European security,” Majcin says.

“Because these weapons are central to Russia’s power projection in Europe and because Russia frequently uses nuclear threats for political pressure, I remain doubtful that Moscow would be willing to give them up.”

As a result, Europe increasingly feels isolated as the US commitment to defend the continent against outsiders seemingly diminishes under the Trump administration’s new national security doctrine. Experts warn that Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons remain the most immediate concern regarding nuclear threats. 

“Europe must therefore seriously address its limited air defence capabilities. This includes the ability to protect key hubs and critical infrastructure, as well as developing more robust defences against low-flying cruise missiles,” Majcin says.

“To strengthen deterrence vis-a-vis Russia, France and the UK may need to consider options related to tactical nuclear capabilities. At the strategic level, Europe risks being outnumbered by the major nuclear powers, namely the US, Russia, and China. As the only nuclear-weapon states in Europe, France and the UK may need to reassess the size and role of their arsenals.”

Majcin also highlights Europe’s budget constraints amid deteriorating financial conditions, warning that limited fiscal space could make it more difficult for European states to expand or strengthen their nuclear and broader defence capabilities.

Financial pressures are not limited to Europe. The high cost of maintaining and modernising nuclear arsenals also shapes strategic calculations in both Washington and Moscow, where economic considerations continue to influence debates over the size and future of nuclear forces.  

“It is in the financial interests of America and Russia to limit the number of warheads and delivery systems because these are very expensive. Russia needs to maintain an up-to-date inventory more than America, because nuclear weapons are the only real trappings of great power status that the country has left,” Erickson, the American military analyst, says.

“As a result, the Russians are not as interested in increasing the number of expensive warheads as they are in modernisation and testing.”