How unclear US strategy could turn the Iran war into a dangerous Hormuz escalation

Uncertainty about US war goals in Iran is fueling concerns over the lack of a clear military endgame, risking increased instability in the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial energy route. 

Though Washington has given occasional hints that the conflict might resolve soon, the unclear objectives—whether reopening the strait, pressuring Tehran, or broader strategic aims—leave allies and adversaries unsure of the US's intentions. 

At the same time, Iran has indicated its preparedness for a prolonged confrontation, raising the likelihood of an extended conflict with significant regional and economic repercussions.

Since the beginning of military offensives, Washington has offered varying reasons for its strikes, ranging from reducing Iran’s missile capabilities to limiting its nuclear ambitions.

Analysts warn that, without clearly articulated objectives, US military attacks risk creating uncertainty not only on the battlefield but also across global energy markets, which are already sensitive to disruptions in the region.

Ozgur Korpe, an academic at the National Defence University, states that the zigzag messaging of the Trump administration indicates that Washington lacks a clear, coherent objective regarding Iran.

This ambiguity could negatively influence the progress of a potential Hormuz operation, for which the Trump administration also outlined different objectives, ranging from American control of the strait and the “take oil” approach in Iran to advising allies to “go to the Strait, and just TAKE IT," according to Korpe. 

Although Trump considers himself an expert in dealmaking and often hides his true goals behind shifting war rhetoric, Korpe believes this approach is strategically unwise from a military perspective. 

“The purpose of the operation, that is, what it aims to achieve, is not concealed; there is no need to. If you want to gain public support, you openly state the purpose of the operation,” Korpe, a former Turkish military officer, tells TRT World.  

“However, the expected political and military conditions at the end of the operation and how it will be carried out can be kept secret.”

If political leaders do not state their objectives clearly, it might lead to a dangerous “mission creep” in military language, says Korpe, a phenomenon Robert Pape, an academic on the concept of escalation dominance, calls the “escalation trap”. 

Mission creep and escalation trap

Mission creep or escalation trap refers to a situation where a military operation expands beyond its initially stated objectives without a clear end point, which is seen as a significant risk to political-security decision-making processes. 

To prevent mission creep or escalation traps, the US military leadership under Colin Powell, who led the First Gulf War, devised an outline later known as the Powell Doctrine, according to Korpe. 

The Powell Doctrine asserts that military force should be overwhelming and only used as a last resort. Objectives must be well-defined, backed by a clear exit strategy, and the operation should have widespread local and international support.

Under the military framework of the Powell doctrine, the ongoing ‘Operation Epic Fury’, including the possibility of a Hormuz operation, provides significant deficiencies in terms of strategic thinking, according to Korpe.  

Initially, the US seemed to target a limited operation against Iran by striking the country’s top leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani, the de facto head of the military-political establishment, and other senior IRGC generals. 

However, the Trump administration’s expectation that this would cause the leadership to collapse or provoke an internal rebellion has not yet come true. 

The US-Israel attacks have also hit Iranian missile sites, oil depots, naval forces, and other military and civialian targets. 

Their goal is to stop Iran's retaliation against Israel and US bases in the Gulf. 

However, Tehran has persisted in attacking both Israel and Gulf targets hosting US military and financial assets, recently indicating that even if the US seeks to end the conflict, Iran is prepared to continue fighting. 

According to Korpe, this limited American strategy—intended to establish a security buffer around Israel—has not succeeded so far. 

This failure could lead the US to escalate the conflict into ground operations in the Hormuz region and other Iranian territories. 

“However, the size of the forces amassed in the Gulf region is not yet sufficient for a comprehensive operational campaign like the Hormuz requires. In other words, the concept of limited use of force remains more relevant to explain the current situation,”  he says. 

Other experts share a similar perspective to Korpe. 

"If you're going to take the Strait of Hormuz back, you're going to have to control an over 100-mile stretch by 20 miles deep into Iran... That would be 100,000+ troops just for this footprint... We don't have the troops to occupy Iran," Robert A. Pape, who is also a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, said in a recent interview. 

How ground operation proceed

Although Trump proposes ending the war in two to three weeks, ongoing military deployments to the Gulf suggest the US is exploring a possible ground offensive targeting Iranian islands, the Strait of Hormuz, and possibly mainland Iran, as experts indicate.  

The only measure of the evolution of a limited conflict into a comprehensive war is the real intention of ‘Operation Epic Fury’, which remains unclear, warns Korpe. 

But “as a tactical signal”, when a clash on Iranian islands in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz begins between US and Iranian land/sea/air operational/tactical level units conducting open operations, it can be said that “the ground operation has begun," he says. 

The US could target various locations in the Gulf, starting from Kharg Island, which manages 90 percent of Tehran’s oil, to three smaller islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—near the strategic strait. 

Alternatively, it might undertake a more risky ground operation across mainland Iran to confiscate enriched uranium from Isfahan and other sites. 

Eslami, a political scientist at the European University Institute, doubts that the US will really target Kharg Island because it is very far from the Strait of Hormuz. 

“Taking Kharg doesn’t help opening Hormuz. Even if they take it, it is impossible to hold it,” the professor tells TRT World. 

But the other three islands, which have long been disputed between Iran and the UAE, lie off Hormuz, which might be the most likely targets of a possible US ground offensive. 

Abu Dhabi has recently indicated that it can also contribute to this military action. 

“If the US takes it and hands it over to the UAE, they might be able to control it,” says Eslami. 

Amphibious operation? 

In addition to possible strikes on islands in the Gulf, analysts say the United States could employ a range of unconventional tactics, including arming paramilitary groups within Iran to destabilise the government or pursuing a risky amphibious landing on Iranian territory. 

Such scenarios, while difficult to execute, remain part of broader military contingency planning.

If the US operation were to escalate to ground assault, whether aimed at Iranian islands or the mainland, they would likely fall under what the American military doctrine defines as Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO). 

This doctrine defines operations such as "seizing and holding a lodgement in the face of armed opposition," which involve establishing a secure foothold that enables the continuous arrival of troops, equipment, and supplies.

A lodgment, in military terms, is a critical zone inside hostile territory that enables continuous troop deployment and creates operational space for further manoeuvres.

However, executing such operations is among the most complex and resource-intensive forms of warfare. 

“While JFEO is among the most difficult military undertakings, an amphibious operation is its most intense and hardest part," Korpe says.

Given current force deployments, Korpe argues that Washington lacks the scale of personnel and logistical preparation required for a full-scale preparation and amphibious assault against Iranian islands or mainland territory.

Under conventional wisdom, he says, such a military offensive would typically be avoided.

Korpe emphasises that deception planning is also as vital as any forced-entry operation. It is a fundamental military strategy aimed at misleading an adversary about the timing, location, or scale of an attack. 

These plans can involve feints, misinformation campaigns, or simulated troop movements designed to divert enemy forces and lessen resistance at the actual point of entry.

“A forced entry operation must necessarily include a comprehensive deception plan, because 'all warfare relies on deception’,” he says. 

However, Korpe argues that signs of strategic inconsistency are already visible, with mixed messaging from Washington fuelling speculation rather than confusion among the adversaries. 

This uncertainty has led to widespread speculation within Iran about various possible scenarios, including attacks on strategic islands near the Strait of Hormuz, a direct invasion of the mainland, or airborne strikes aimed at nuclear facilities and leadership sites, the analyst says.