Why Kabul’s backing of India’s claim over disputed Kashmir threatens regional peace

In a stunning diplomatic volte-face, the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan has endorsed New Delhi’s claim to sovereignty over India-administered Kashmir, a move that has fanned tensions with Pakistan and destabilised an already volatile region.

In a joint statement with India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar on October 10, Foreign Minister of the interim Afghan government, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi referred to the disputed region of Kashmir as part of India, eliciting words of strong condemnation from Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kashmir is part of the wider Himalayan region that both New Delhi and Islamabad claim in full but administer in part.

Both countries have fought multiple wars over the decades, the most recent being the four-day clash in May that analysts consider the biggest air battle since World War II in terms of the number of aircraft involved.

“The joint statement is highly insensitive to the sacrifices and sentiments of the people of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir in their just struggle for the right to self-determination,” Pakistan said.

For Islamabad, the shift in Kabul’s policy can embolden anti-Pakistan forces across the border and escalate security conflicts.

Pakistan’s role in the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 is no secret, as its mediation was critical in securing the US withdrawal.

The objective of Pakistan was to have a friendly neighbour to its West, which could help Islamabad fight terrorist groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Yet Pak-Afghan relations have deteriorated into open hostility, with border skirmishes claiming hundreds of lives and displacing thousands.

Pakistan recently struck TTP hideouts in Afghanistan, killing “more than 200 Afghan fighters”. A counter-attack from the Afghan side killed 23 Pakistani soldiers, leading to the closure of the main border crossings at Torkham and Chaman.

Amir Zia, a Karachi-based political analyst, tells TRT World that Pakistan’s shift to “coercive diplomacy” to root out terrorism has emboldened the TTP, which is accused of conducting at least 600 attacks on Pakistani security forces in the past year alone.

“The emboldened terrorists are no longer hitting soft civilian targets, but targeting the Pakistani security forces. This is ominous,” he says.

The recent airstrikes and border clampdowns by Islamabad to eliminate Afghanistan-based terrorists are in stark contrast to the subtler carrot-and-stick approach of past decades that balanced pressure with economic and cultural ties.

The result is a “widened gulf of distrust” that has pushed Kabul towards New Delhi, reviving the anti-Pakistan alliance that Islamabad has long sought to prevent, he says.

Moonis Ahmar, political analyst and former professor of international relations at the University of Karachi, tells TRT World that he sees historical echoes in the Afghan policy shift.

“Afghanistan has had issues with Pakistan since 1947,” he says, recalling how Kabul’s disputes over the border and Pashtun irredentism – meaning one state’s desire to annex the territory of another for ethnic reasons – have fuelled mistrust.

“When you endorse India’s Kashmir sovereignty, what it means is that you’re trying to hurt Pakistan,” Ahmar says, pointing to the Taliban’s statement as a deliberate jab.

Pakistan has always insisted that the Kashmir issue must be resolved in light of UN resolutions from 1948 that call for a plebiscite, while New Delhi claims it is an internal matter, especially after 2019, when it revoked the autonomy of India-administered Kashmir.

Need for diplomacy  

Analysts point out that the Taliban’s endorsement of India’s stance on the Kashmir dispute reflects a clear shift from their first stint in power (1996–2001) when they decisively sided with Pakistan.

The policy shift coincides with India’s strategic re-engagement with Kabul. After closing its embassy in 2021, New Delhi has now restored ties by upgrading its Kabul mission.

For Pakistan, the strategic fallout of recent developments appears to be dire.

“A breakdown in relations with the Afghan Taliban means that the terrorist threat will continue to haunt the country,” Zia says, adding that India will try to exploit Pakistan’s estranged ties with Kabul.

“This situation needs to be countered via effective diplomacy and friends like China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE,” he adds.

Ahmar agrees, saying border clashes with Afghanistan exacerbate the crisis.

He warns of a “two-pronged threat” from Afghanistan and India, a scenario Pakistan did not anticipate when the country’s top intelligence official visited Kabul in 2021, expecting a friendly regime.

India’s investments in Afghanistan to the tune of $3 billion from 2001 to 2021 offer a lifeline, unlike Pakistan’s strained trade ties, disrupted by frequent border closures.

Yet Zia remains optimistic about Pakistan’s leverage. “Pakistan and Afghanistan’s long-term interests are intertwined. Kabul will benefit more from having close relations with Islamabad rather than India,” he says.

Zia advocates reviving Pakistan’s “old playbook” of engaging the Taliban bilaterally and through allies like China and Saudi Arabia.

“Pakistan should use economic and trade relations as a positive influence to create a win-win situation,” he says, urging an end to crackdowns on Afghan refugees and barriers to cross-border tribal ties.

Zia warns that Pakistan’s airstrikes, while tactically effective, “will only prolong the conflict,” allowing India to exploit the chaos.

“Let the divided tribes and families on both sides of the Durand Line meet one another. This people-to-people relationship is our strength, not a weakness,” he says.