A numbers game in the sky: Iran’s missile waves are testing defence limits

When Iran launched its ‘True Promise-4’ operation on February 28 2026, this was not merely another act of retaliation. 

It was a more calculated move: a large-scale stress test of regional air defences, escalation thresholds, and strategic assets.

The strikes came in response to coordinated US and Israeli attacks on Iranian territory. 

But Tehran’s answer was not improvised. 

It followed a pattern we’ve been watching since April–October 2024 and June 2025. 

By keeping the ‘True Promise’ label, Iran was signalling continuity: this is part of a longer campaign, not a one-off response.

At the heart of Iran’s strategy is a simple idea: if deterrence fails, retaliation must remain credible. 

For years, that credibility rested on two pillars: its regional proxy network and its ballistic missile arsenal. 

But after Israeli SEAD raids throughout 2024 and during the June 13 2025 “12-day conflict”, that balance shifted. Much of Iran’s forward network was degraded.

So Iran leaned on what it still fully controls: missiles and kamikaze drones.

And it used them at scale.

The first salvo came at around 11:10 am Türkiye time (UTC+3) with roughly 30 ballistic missiles. By 11:28 am, a second wave followed. 

Then more waves continued into the night. Over the next 15 days, the operation expanded into roughly 54 waves of combined ballistic missile and loitering drone attacks.

The figures are not entirely consistent; this is typical in an ongoing conflict.

However, cross-referenced open-source estimates indicate that between 750 and 1,100 ballistic missiles and approximately 2,800 to 3,200 kamikaze drones have been launched across the region.

Iranian officials, meanwhile, claimed around 700 ballistic missiles and 3,600 drones.

Even allowing for discrepancies, the scale is hard to ignore.

A numbers game

Taken together, these figures and data cast serious doubt on the reliability of pre-war and wartime stockpile estimates, often cited as ‘2,000–3,000".

Israel responded with its layered defence systems: Arrow-2, Arrow-3, David’s Sling, and THAAD. 

But in the early phase of the conflict, there were signs that Arrow-3 interceptors were used more selectively. That likely reflects a simple reality: interceptor stockpiles matter just as much as technology.

Missile defence is, in part, a numbers game.

Iran appears to have played that game carefully. One of the most notable aspects of ‘True Promise-4’ was its mix of missile types.

Newer solid-fuel systems, such as the Fattah-1 (2023) and Kheibar Shekan (2022), were used alongside older liquid-fuel missiles, such as the Shahab-3 variants (2003/2007) and Emad. This was not redundancy; it was deliberate layering.

The newer systems are equipped with manoeuvrable reentry vehicles (hybrid MaRV+TVC). During the terminal phase, they can manoeuvre at speeds exceeding Mach 5, complicating interception by systems like THAAD and Arrow.

But it is important to be precise: these are not “true” hypersonic glide vehicles. Their advantage lies in manoeuvrability during reentry, not sustained hypersonic flight.

At the same time, older systems still matter. 

Fired in large numbers, they serve a saturation role, forcing defenders to expend interceptors. 

This is where cost asymmetry becomes critical: a relatively low-cost missile can trigger the launch of a much more expensive interceptor. Over time, that imbalance adds up.

Iran also appears to have relied heavily on cluster-type warheads. Systems such as the Ghadr-F and Khorramshahr-4 reportedly used submunitions.

Open-source imagery suggests that the Khorramshahr-4 can carry up to 80 bomblets, each weighing around 18 kg, with a total warhead mass approaching 1,800 kg.

We saw evidence of this on March 5 2026 (19th wave) targeting Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport, as well as during later waves (22nd, 23rd, 43rd, and 44th) in Israel’s northern and central regions. The observed damage scale is consistent with the effects of wide-area submunitions.

Flight times for these medium-range ballistic missiles, typically with ranges of 1,100 to 1,600 km, were 7 to 13 minutes, depending on the launch location. Launch sites reportedly included Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, Damavand, and the Alborz region (Pardis).

Alongside these, Iran made effective use of shorter-range systems. The Fateh family, including Fateh-110, Fateh-313, and Raad-500, with ranges between 200 and 800 km, were used for more precise strikes.

This is not new. We saw similar accuracy in 2020 (Ayn al-Asad Airbase) and 2022 (Erbil). In this attack, these missiles appear to have targeted high-value assets in Jordan and the Gulf, including radar and early warning systems.

That targeting logic is straightforward: degrade the sensors, and the entire defence system becomes less effective.

What we are seeing, in effect, is a battle over bottlenecks.

For the US and Israel, one key objective has been to track and destroy mobile launchers (TELs),  reducing Iran’s firing rate. 

For Iran, the focus has been on high-value, low-density targets: Patriot and THAAD batteries, radar systems such as AN/TPY-2 and AN/FPS-132, and other critical nodes.

Another bottleneck is interceptor inventory. Sustained launches force difficult decisions, such as which intercepts to prioritise and which to let through.

Iran also appears to be expanding the battlefield beyond direct military targets.

Threats to energy infrastructure, tankers, and airports in Gulf countries hosting United States military and financial assets suggest a broader economic pressure strategy that raises the cost of conflict at the regional and global levels.

And then there is the psychological area of the test.

Repeated waves, urban targeting, and the use of submunitions all contribute to sustained pressure on civilian populations. This is not incidental. It is part of the signalling.

So what has changed?

Not the fundamentals. Iran still relies on missiles as a core deterrent. But the way it uses them is evolving. There is now more coordination, more layering, and a clearer link between tactical choices and strategic outcomes.

Old missiles for saturation. New ones for penetration. Drones for persistence.

It is not a radical shift. But it is a meaningful one.

And perhaps the most important takeaway is this: the balance between offensive missile capabilities and defensive systems in the region is not static. 

It is being tested, wave after wave, day after day.

For observers, the key takeaway is not just the scale of the operation, but its sustainability. If Iran can maintain this tempo over time, it raises serious questions about the long-term balance between offensive missile forces and defensive systems in the region.

And that balance, increasingly, may define the next phase of the conflict.