Murat SofuogluAs Washington seeks ways to end the Gulf standoff, countries across the Middle East are increasingly looking beyond the Strait of Hormuz, expanding existing pipelines and reviving long-abandoned transport corridors to reduce their dependence on a route that has become increasingly vulnerable to conflict.
From Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Iraq, Syria and Türkiye, governments are exploring alternative land routes capable of carrying oil, gas and trade while bypassing the narrow waterway.
Analysts say that if the crisis persists, the region's gradual shift towards these corridors could weaken Iran's leverage over global energy markets while reshaping the political and economic geography of the Middle East.
Dania Koleilat Khatib, an expert in US-Arab relations and co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, highlights increasing regional interest in land corridors, from Saudi and UAE pipelines to the Syria-Iraq pipeline and Iraq-Türkiye Development Road.
“Hormuz will become less and less important,” Khatib tells TRT World.
Some existing and developing land routes, including pipelines and other regional infrastructure, include the recently inaugurated Saudi-Türkiye Hejaz railway project, which aims to reach the Gulf of Oman from Turkish territory, bypassing Hormuz.
“It’s much better to have alternative routes than to have a fight with Iran on Hormuz because the military conflict with Iran does not guarantee any concrete result even with the US involvement,” she says.
“The US will also encourage alternative routes and the Middle East will turn to alternative corridors because the region does not want to be subject to Iran's blackmail.”
Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, the two heavyweights of the Middle East alongside Pakistan, have recently signed a military pact signalling their intention to develop alternative strategic avenues to defend regional interests with indigenous forces against any potential threat from Israel, Iran or any outsiders.
Emerging alternatives
The region is not starting from scratch. Saudi Arabia and the UAE already operate pipelines that allow part of their oil exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, with a combined capacity of nearly 10 million barrels per day—roughly half the volume that passed through the waterway before the current crisis.
Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline transports crude from the kingdom's eastern oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, providing Riyadh with an alternative export route that avoids the Gulf. At full capacity, it can carry up to seven million barrels of oil a day.
The UAE has also invested in bypass infrastructure through the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which links Abu Dhabi's oil fields to the Gulf of Oman, allowing exports to avoid the Strait of Hormuz altogether. The pipeline can transport between 1.5 and 1.8 million barrels per day.
Neither country considers its existing infrastructure sufficient.
Saudi Arabia is considering expanding its pipeline network to connect with neighbouring Gulf producers or building new export routes, while the UAE has already completed about half of a new west-east pipeline project that could eventually double its crude export capacity via Fujairah.
“Several of the best alternatives for crude oil - Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah line - have performed well despite being within range of Iran's weapons, though that could change any time,” Chris Newton, a senior analyst at International Crisis Group, tells TRT World.
During the war, Iran has targeted both UAE and Saudi oil facilities from Fujairah to Yanbu, signalling that even the safety of alternative routes might be compromised and demonstrating how geography can become a deadly trap.
Not every Gulf state has the same room to manoeuvre.
Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar lack alternative export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, leaving them far more exposed to prolonged disruption.
Analysts say those countries may eventually have to rely on Saudi or Emirati infrastructure to keep their energy exports flowing.
Qatar could face particular challenges because its economy depends heavily on liquefied natural gas rather than crude oil exports.
“Crude oil can probably be rerouted the most in the short-term, but other commodities like LNG less so,” Newton says.
Elsewhere, Iraq is also seeking alternatives. Following a sharp decline in oil exports during the Hormuz crisis, Baghdad has renewed efforts to revive the long-defunct Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline, which would transport crude across Syria to the Mediterranean.
“From Syria’s perspective, we are very much looking forward to such a project. This is not simply about creating a transit route. It would represent a global commitment to Syria, to its recovery, and to its strategic importance, turning our country into a major regional corridor,” Omar Alhariri, a Syrian journalist and political analyst, says.
Although developing alternative corridors around the Strait of Hormuz could cost between $50 million and $100 million and take years to complete, Alhariri argues that simply investing in them could reassure global markets by signalling that the region is no longer wholly dependent on a single chokepoint.
“Markets would be less vulnerable to panic whenever tensions arise that could threaten the Strait of Hormuz, as we are witnessing now. The key point is that there would be a Plan B,” he tells TRT World.
“It is important to take this strategic card out of Iran’s hands, because Tehran fully understands the leverage and importance of controlling such a critical chokepoint.”
Besides the Syria-Iraq talks, Ankara and Baghdad, the two neighbours that have operated the 970-kilometre Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline from central Iraq to Türkiye’s Mediterranean coast for decades, have recently signed a deal allowing crude to flow to global markets.
The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is Iraq’s largest crude export route, with a maximum capacity of up to 1.5 million bpd.
In the wake of Hormuz tensions, Iraq has also recently launched Basra-Haditha pipeline project with a planned capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, which aims to transport crude oil to not only Syria’s Baniyas and Türkiye’s Ceyhan in the Mediterranean but also to Aqaba port of Jordan in the Red Sea.
Alternatives impacting regional equations
Analysts say the development of alternative trade and energy corridors could gradually redistribute political and economic influence across the Middle East, reducing the dominance of the Strait of Hormuz as the region's primary export gateway.
“The diversion of a certain volume of oil flow to those corridors is expected to shift the current concentration of power toward the countries hosting these projects,” Rasim Ozcan, professor of economics at Istanbul University, tells TRT World.
“However, the scale of their capacity will be the decisive factor. Since reaching a capacity significant enough to substantially alter the status quo—if achievable at all—would take years,” Ozcan adds, warning that no one should expect quick political results from these alternatives in the near term.
Infrastructure alone, however, will not determine the success of these projects. Experts say regional governments will also need to align their political and economic interests, despite continuing disagreements between countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE over a range of regional issues.
“Some of these new corridors would require reworking political relationships and tying some actors together in the long-term - like Gulf exporters with Yemen and Syria, and potentially give greater geopolitical leverage to anyone able to pose a credible threat to the alternatives, maybe even some smaller groups,” Newton says.
“They would also influence commercial relationships extending outside the region - if more Gulf energy flows to the Mediterranean, it's obviously closer to some consumers than others. The value of the Suez Canal and Egypt's revenue could change depending on the corridors that actually get built and how that affects ship traffic.”
The expansion of alternative corridors, however, would not eliminate the region's geopolitical risks.
Analysts warn that new pipelines, railways and highways could simply create new targets for Iran and its regional allies, including the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq.
“The matter here is less one of logistics as it is one of geopolitics. Even proposed overland routes amount to the creation of new targets for Iranians and Houthis, who can project power--military power across the region,” Victor Bruno, a geopolitical analyst, tells TRT World.
Newton also believes Iran could adapt if alternative routes begin to reduce the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.
“If the value of Hormuz were reduced, Iran's leverage over the region and the global economy would weaken to the extent that it was unable to threaten Hormuz alternatives. That could mean Iran doubling down on its ability to threaten regional energy infrastructure through missiles, drones, and proxies, or it could mean greater stability,” he says.
Even so, analysts caution against assuming that overland corridors can fully replace maritime trade.
Around 80 percent of global commerce still moves by sea, making the complete bypassing of the Strait of Hormuz an unlikely prospect.
“They want overland routes to do the work that the ocean does,” Bruno tells TRT World.
“That's a huge ask.”
