A year after Assad's fall, China takes first tentative steps into Syria affairs

The world’s top development financier maintained a restrained approach towards New Syria, limiting contacts to low levels and withholding diplomatic or economic commitments. That cautious era now appears to be ending

By Kazim Alam
Beijing had kept Syria “at arm’s length”, but the foreign ministers’ meeting signalled China’s willingness to move past its “wait-and-see posture”. / TRT World

After nearly a year of deliberate caution following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, China has signalled a warmer embrace of the new Syrian government under President Ahmed al Sharaa.

A landmark visit by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani to Beijing marked a shift, highlighting Beijing’s growing confidence in Damascus and its potential as a reliable partner for economic development.

“China is ready to actively consider participating in Syria’s economic reconstruction,” said a statement by the Chinese foreign ministry after the high-level meeting.

For nearly a year, the world’s top development financier maintained a restrained approach towards New Syria, limiting contacts to low levels and withholding significant diplomatic or economic commitments.

That cautious era now appears to be ending, with Beijing saying it is “willing” to work with international partners to help Syria achieve stability.

Recep T Teke, an expert on Levant studies at the Ankara-based Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), tells TRT World that the meeting of the two foreign ministers symbolises a decisive shift in China’s policy towards Syria.

“The visit marked a clear turning point in China-Syria relations,” he says.

Decades of kleptocratic rule and a brutal civil war left Syria’s economy in tatters, with the GDP plummeting to a record low of $21 billion as more than 90 percent of Syrians fell below the poverty line.

Beijing had previously kept Syria “at arm’s length”, but the foreign ministers’ meeting signalled China’s willingness to move past its “wait-and-see posture” and gradually deepen its engagement with the new Syrian leadership, he adds.

“The visit effectively amounted to China’s first full political recognition of Syria’s new government,” Teke says, noting that it carries a “considerable symbolic and practical weight” in bolstering Damascus’s standing on the global stage.

Hanyi Wang, a researcher at the Pacific Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, tells TRT World that China has always adhered to the “Syrian-led, Syrian-owned” principle in dealing with Damascus.

She says the foreign ministers’ meeting was “part of the normal diplomatic engagement between the two countries,” designed to bolster bilateral relations ahead of the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2026.

What some observers interpret as a sudden “change” in Beijing’s stance, Wang argues, is merely the “dynamic application of China’s consistent principles”.

China’s foreign policy is defined by “continuity and stability”, while respecting Syrian sovereignty and the will of its people, she adds.

Reconstruction under BRI 

The improving security environment and the unconditional lifting of major sanctions, particularly the Caesar Act, have created fertile ground for economic cooperation in Syria.

Through the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, the US imposed economic and travel sanctions on anyone, Syrian or foreign, who helped the former Assad regime’s military, intelligence, aviation, or energy-production sectors.

In 2022, Syria joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious infrastructure development project that aims to connect about 150 countries to Beijing through global economic corridors.

Syria’s participation in the BRI remained largely symbolic under the Assad regime due to its international isolation amid intense civil war.

But the BRI membership now holds genuine promise for Syria as the civil war-ravaged country looks for a major infrastructure upgrade.

“With the gradual improvement in the security situation, the BRI offers significant opportunities for Syria’s post-war reconstruction and economic recovery,” Wang says.

She outlines three key areas where Chinese investment can be critical. 

One, infrastructure rebuilding in power, communications, and transportation. Two, production capacity cooperation through industrial parks and technology sharing. And three, enhanced exchanges in trade, economy, and culture to fuel long-term growth.

“China will adhere to market principles and explore mutually beneficial cooperation models with Syria to support its sustainable development,” she says.

Teke echoes this view, saying that sanctions relief and greater stability have removed many obstacles that once deterred Chinese companies, which are known for their caution against “political and legal risks”.

The BRI framework now enables meaningful investment in critical sectors, such as energy, highways, rail networks, ports, and telecommunications, precisely the foundations that New Syria needs to restore services and restart its economy, he says.

Reconstruction costs are estimated by the World Bank at about $216 billion, making China’s proven expertise in post-conflict rebuilding especially valuable.

Unlike conditional Western models, Teke notes, Chinese investment prioritises state-to-state cooperation, commercial viability, and non-interference in domestic political issues.

This approach to economic cooperation will allow the Sharaa government to pursue development, while maintaining political autonomy, he says.

Syria’s strategic location as a potential hub linking the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Gulf, and Central Asia will help Damascus reinsert itself into regional supply chains. It will transform reconstruction from a short-term recovery effort into a sustainable engine for long-term economic growth, he says.

On the diplomatic front as well, China’s support is proving instrumental in Syria’s global reintegration.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Beijing has consistently defended Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, while opposing external interference, Wang says.

She notes that this stance helps create a necessary international environment for the political resolution of all conflicts in Syria.

International players step up

By showing its willingness to extend greater economic cooperation, China is joining other international partners in helping Syria get back on its feet. 

Regional powers like Türkiye are already extending generous help for large-scale infrastructure projects. International financial institutions have shown willingness to play their part in bringing the Syrian economy back from the dead.

An IMF delegation visited Damascus in June, the first by the Washington-based global lender since 2009.

The visit was followed by Damascus signing 12 agreements worth $14 billion, including a $4 billion deal with a consortium partly consisting of Turkish firms, to build a new airport and a $2 billion contract with the UAE’s national investment corporation for a subway system in the capital.

At the same time, the new Syrian government has received global recognition, with al Sharaa meeting US President Donald Trump and speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York.

The country is in desperate need of economic assistance. By 2023, the size of the economy had shrunk 85 percent compared to 2012.

The Assad regime could not even pay adequate salaries to government workers. Average public-sector salaries in real terms dropped by 75 percent between 2012 and 2023. The drop in the subsidy budget was 83 percent over the same period.

Syria has finally moved past the harsh sanctions that limited its ability to trade with the world. Teke points to China’s recent abstention in a UN vote on lifting remaining sanctions as a meaningful “gesture of goodwill” towards the new Syrian leadership.

“China’s willingness to raise concerns and support Syrian sovereignty in international forums provides Damascus with an additional layer of political support in the face of heightened Israeli aggression,” he says.