As Bangladesh readies for first post-Hasina polls, voters likely to approve Dhaka's Pakistan pivot

Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina's regime in August 2024, Bangladesh has begun warming up to Pakistan in a way not seen for decades – a pivot that may affect the outcome of next month’s general election.

High-ranking Pakistani officials are visiting Dhaka again, direct flights between Dhaka and Karachi have restarted, and talks are underway about Bangladesh buying Pakistani fighter jets.

These steps come alongside large public rallies welcoming Pakistani scholars, growing Pakistani business presence in Dhaka, and Pakistan's strong support for Bangladesh against India at the International Cricket Council (ICC).

Many Bangladeshis now see Pakistan as a welcome counterbalance after years of heavy Indian influence under Hasina’s 15-year rule. 

India enjoyed warm relations with Bangladesh as it midwifed the latter’s birth at the end of a full-fledged war with Pakistan in 1971. Bilateral ties improved to unforeseen levels after 2009 when Hasina returned to power in Dhaka, with the two countries forging a deep economic and security partnership.

But the ouster of Hasina’s government in 2024 on the heels of an India Out campaign has put the close alliance between the two nations in jeopardy.

As Bangladesh prepares for elections in February, analysts say this shift in public mood can help parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami – which are traditionally seen as having a soft corner for Pakistan – win power.

They say the shift is driven by a public weary of Indian dominance under Hasina and eager for balanced relations that prioritise sovereignty and mutual benefit.

“Bangladesh has seen a period of hegemony, domination and diktat by India under the regime of Hasina, and that has been a bitter lesson for them,” Mushahid Hussain Sayed, a prominent Pakistani analyst and former chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, tells TRT World.

The roots of this realignment trace back to the chaotic ouster of Hasina in August 2024, when student-led protests forced her to flee to India, where she continues to live in exile.

Hasina's rule was characterised by unchecked Indian influence, economic dependency, and overt political meddling, alienating parts of Bangladeshi society. 

Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has been in power since 2014, enjoyed a close relationship that originated from their similar positions on issues like the handling of opposition and Islamic religious parties.

Sayed says the shared historical bonds between Pakistan and Bangladesh are rooted in the joint struggle for Muslim nationalism in the 1940s under Bengali leaders like Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy and Maulana Bhashani.

“Time is a great healer. This is a moment of reconciliation and rapprochement,” he says, framing the current warming as a natural restoration of ties suppressed by Hasina’s pro-India bias.

Growing cultural, military exchanges 

Post-Hasina, the interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has swiftly moved to diversify alliances, with Pakistan emerging as a key partner.

High-level visits from Pakistani military officials have become frequent, culminating in talks for a potential defence pact, including the sale of JF-17 fighters co-developed by Pakistan and China.

Economic ties are flourishing too: direct trade resumed in February with a 50,000-ton rice shipment from Pakistan, the first since Bangladesh's independence in 1971.

Pakistani businesses are establishing a foothold in Dhaka, further cementing people-to-people connections.

Zia Chowdhury, a Dhaka-based journalist, highlights the grassroots enthusiasm fueling this shift.

“After the fall of Hasina, so many Pakistani singers and artists were coming to Dhaka and other cities to perform,” he tells TRT World, highlighting how cultural exchanges have bridged old divides.

The Pakistani high commissioner in Dhaka became more popular than some local politicians after the ouster of the Hasina government, he says.

Chowdhury also highlights the surge in political engagements as a sign of the shifting sentiment.

“Political parties are now more comfortable meeting Pakistani officials and visiting Pakistan,” he says, while referring to a series of talks between Pakistani diplomats and Bangladeshi political parties.

Public rallies welcoming Pakistani politico-religious scholars have been particularly emblematic of this sentiment. Thousands gathered in Dhaka for lectures on shared Islamic heritage, drawing from longstanding ties between Bangladeshi and Pakistani seminaries.

Asif Bin Ali, an Atlanta-based geopolitical analyst associated with Georgia State University, tells TRT World that these connections have persisted despite state-level hostilities under Hasina.

“There is a long intellectual lineage here: our Qawmi and Deobandi institutions historically look towards seminaries in India and Pakistan as reference points,” he says.

While acknowledging the religious rallies’ limited appeal among urban elites, Ali points to broader cultural affinities. 

“Pakistani cuisine, dress and drama are very popular in Dhaka. New restaurants, Eid fashion trends, cross-border food vlogs, streaming of Pakistani serials, all of this has created a softer cultural familiarity,” he says.

In today’s Bangladesh, there is “clearly more comfort and curiosity” for Pakistan than there was 20 years ago, he adds.

Pakistan's stance at the ICC has further endeared it to Bangladeshis, especially amid escalating tensions with India.

Pakistan vocally supported Bangladesh's position when Dhaka refused to tour India for the 2026 T20 World Cup because of safety concerns stemming from soured relations post-Hasina.

Islamabad backed Dhaka’s call for neutral venues, drawing parallels to its own policy of not touring India due to geopolitical strains.

“Pakistan is showing solidarity with Bangladesh on the World Cup (issue) because Bangladesh has been a victim of double standards imposed by India through the ICC,” Sayed says.

Not a client state

This shift in the public mood stems from years of perceived domination, analysts say.

“In the case of India, frustration focuses on water, border killings and Delhi’s open support for a deeply discredited electoral process in Dhaka,” Ali says.

Hasina's regime amplified this perception by cracking down against its domestic opponents, a strategy that drove anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh to new heights.

“There is a feeling that they are natural partners, that the bonds of their old relationship with Pakistan need to be restored to both protect the sovereignty of Bangladesh and oppose Indian hegemony,” Sayed says.

As Bangladesh heads to the polls on February 12, analysts expect this sentiment to influence electoral outcomes significantly.

BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami, both with historical affinities for Pakistan, are frontrunners.

Opinion polls indicate a tight race, with BNP leading at 34.7 percent support and Jamaat close behind at 33.6 percent. 

Awami League, Hasina's party, is barred from contesting, leaving the field open for these parties to tap into the pro-Pakistan sentiment.

Sayed highlights how BNP and Jamaat can leverage this opportunity. “Both political parties have deep roots. They would like to… mobilise public opinion in favour of ties with Pakistan as a leverage against Indian hegemony,” Sayed says.

He notes their victimisation under the Hasina government that “almost physically exterminated” the Jamaat through officially sanctioned harassment.

“There’s already a favourable public opinion for these two parties, which are nationalist and anti-India. Both of them want to be friends with Pakistan and friends with China,” Sayed adds.

But Ali differentiates the two leading parties in terms of their respective approach towards Pakistan.

“Jamaat historically has a much softer corner for Pakistan, for ideological as well as historical reasons. For them, strengthening ties with Islamabad is part of a larger story where Pakistan is framed as a ‘natural ally’ against Indian influence,” he says.

The BNP, however, maintains a more cautious position towards Pakistan, he says.

“BNP pushes the slogan ‘Na Dilli, Na Pindi, Bangladesh first’,” he says, while referring to a slogan that emphasises Dhaka’s independence from both Pakistani and Indian influence.

Referring to public surveys, Ali says a large number of Bangladeshis want normal relations with both India and Pakistan. 

“They do not want permanent demonisation of either country. People prefer easier visas, trade, cultural exchanges and less shouting,” he says.

“BNP will likely keep playing the ‘balanced’ card and present itself as the party that can reset ties with both neighbours without becoming anyone’s client,” Ali says, while noting that Jamaat will appeal to religious constituencies that view Pakistan as the “natural home of true Islam”.