Kazim AlamIn a sign of a major foreign policy reset by Dhaka following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, a group of Bangladeshi civil servants has begun mid-career training in Pakistan, marking a first between the two nations.
The new training programme replaces – for the time being, at least – the pre-2024 arrangement with India, which hosted Bangladeshi officials at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie, a hill station in the northern Indian state of Uttarakhand
Twelve senior bureaucrats, including one additional secretary and 11 joint secretaries, are participating in the programme at Lahore’s Civil Services Academy, marking the first structured initiative of its kind.
Analysts say the shift reflects Dhaka’s attempt to diversify its bureaucratic exposure and strengthen ties with Islamabad after years of strained relations under the previous pro-India regime.
Pakistan is bearing all expenses for the training.
No Bangladeshi bureaucrat has attended a training programme in India since the fall of the Hasina government nearly two years ago.
India is reportedly eager to invite Bangladeshi civil servants for training, even though the relevant agreement between New Delhi and Dhaka expired in April 2025 and hasn’t been renewed.
Bangladesh’s Ministry of Public Administration did not respond to a query about whether Dhaka plans to resume its Mussoorie programme going forward.
The shift comes amid a broader diplomatic reset, as high-ranking Pakistani officials have visited Dhaka, direct flights between Dhaka and Karachi have restarted, and talks are underway about Bangladesh buying Pakistani fighter jets.
Meanwhile, Bangladeshis have welcomed Pakistani scholars in large public rallies. Pakistani businesses have also expanded operations in post-Hasina Bangladesh.
Asif Bin Ali, a Bangladeshi geopolitical analyst associated with Georgia State University in the US, tells TRT World that the development is a signal of Dhaka’s changing foreign policy priorities.
“Bangladesh is trying to show that India will no longer remain the default destination for bureaucratic training and administrative exposure,” he says.
Bangladesh-India ties improved to unforeseen levels after 2009 when Hasina returned to power in Dhaka, with the two countries forging a deep economic and security partnership.
Her rule was characterised by unchecked Indian influence, economic dependency, and overt political meddling, alienating parts of Bangladeshi society.
Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has been in power since 2014, have enjoyed a close relationship that stems from their similar positions on issues such as the handling of opposition and Islamic religious parties.
But the ouster of Hasina’s government in 2024 on the heels of an India Out campaign put the close alliance between Dhaka and New Delhi in jeopardy.
“The Lahore programme also reflects the practical consequences of post-Hasina diplomatic strains, visa difficulties, and the interruption of earlier training arrangements with India,” Ali says.
He notes that the move should not be viewed as a direct snub to India but rather a low-cost diplomatic message.
Dhaka wants more room for manoeuvre, including with Pakistan, without formally abandoning its engagement with New Delhi, he says.
This perspective aligns with the positive trajectory of Dhaka-Islamabad relations since Hasina's 2024 ouster.
Under the interim administration of Muhammad Yunus, which governed the country from August 2024 to February this year, Bangladesh swiftly moved to diversify its alliances, with Pakistan emerging as its key regional partner.
High-level military visits led to talks for a potential defence pact, including the sale of JF-17 fighters co-developed by Pakistan and China.
Economic ties are flourishing with the resumption of direct trade and Pakistani businesses gaining a foothold in Dhaka.
Bangladesh’s conciliatory approach towards Islamabad continues under the present government led by Tarique Rahman, who came to power after winning a general election three months ago.
Diversifying options for civil servant training
Moonis Ahmar, professor of international relations at the University of Karachi and former Asia Fellow at the University of Dhaka, tells TRT World that the regime change in August 2024 has been pivotal for the three major South Asian nations.
“Mohammed Yunus… was the one who went an extra mile in mending fences with Pakistan,” Ahmar says.
The decision to send bureaucrats for training in Pakistan is part of a strategy to diversify options, he says.
“Why should they only go to Mussoorie?” Ahmar asks, rhetorically, while pointing to the nostalgic and historical significance of Lahore’s Civil Services Academy in training Bengali-speaking bureaucrats.
Pakistan and present-day Bangladesh were one country from 1947 to 1971, when India midwifed the latter’s birth at the end of a full-fledged war.
Before the creation of Bangladesh, civil servants from both eastern and western wings of Pakistan received common training at the Civil Services Academy in Lahore.
“Old memories don’t die down easily… Lahore is a city with nostalgic memories for Bangladeshis,” he says.
He notes that the recent training programme extends beyond Lahore, with participants also visiting elite management schools in Islamabad and Karachi.
Historically, the India-Bangladesh civil servant training programmes were more impactful than they appeared, analysts say.
Beginning around 2014 under the Hasina government, these training programmes created “institutional familiarity” between Dhaka and New Delhi, Ali says.
It helped introduce thousands of Bangladeshi officials to Indian administrative models, local governance, and public service systems over the years.
More than 1,000 Bangladeshi civil servants were trained in India between 2019 and 2024 alone.
But Hasina’s long rule created a one-sided dependency among Bangladeshi bureaucrats.
The latest shift symbolically loosens what Ali calls “India’s monopoly over the bureaucratic socialisation in Bangladesh”.
It does not, however, mean that Bangladeshi officials will become “pro-Pakistan” overnight, he says, adding that the new approach promotes balanced exposure for Bangladeshi bureaucrats.
For Pakistan, hosting the training programme offers diplomatic and administrative benefits.
Ahmar highlights the Civil Services Academy’s legacy and how such training programmes strengthen people-to-people and institutional ties, while countering years of hostility engineered under the previous dispensation in Dhaka.
Ali says that Bangladesh should not treat training as a “loyalty test” between India and Pakistan.
Instead, Bangladeshi officials should learn from multiple countries based on specific needs.
“India and Pakistan both have older civil service traditions, and Bangladesh can learn from both without importing their political conflicts,” he says.
The real measure of success, Ali says, will be whether these programmes translate into improved administrative capacity at home.
“If Bangladesh designs a clear training strategy, it can strengthen both civil service capacity and regional bargaining power,” he says.
