2025, the year Türkiye’s long game paid off

As 2025 draws to a close, Türkiye’s patient diplomacy, expanding defence industry, and strategic autonomy have positioned it as a pivotal power across Europe, the Middle East, and Eurasia.

By Timothy Ash
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a naval ceremony in Istanbul, capping a year of growing strategic influence for Türkiye / AA

The Russia-Ukraine war in early 2022 confronted Türkiye with one of the most complex strategic tests in its modern history.

The war erupted at a moment when Ankara’s relationships with both Western partners and Russia were simultaneously vital and fraught.

The conflict threatened to sharpen every existing constraint at once. Energy prices surged, global financial conditions tightened, and Western sanctions on Russia placed Türkiye, a NATO member with deep economic, energy and tourism ties to Moscow, in an unenviable position. Maintaining strategic autonomy without alienating either side appeared, at the time, close to impossible.

Many assumed Ankara would be forced into a binary choice, one that would carry heavy economic and political costs whichever way it turned.

Four years on, that assumption has proved misplaced. Far from being boxed in by events, Türkiye has emerged as one of the more adept geopolitical navigators of the Ukraine war and its wider fallout, turning constraint into leverage and ambiguity into influence.

On the war in Ukraine, first through the Antalya peace talks, its role in the Black Sea grain deal, successive prisoner exchanges and again this year via the Istanbul peace process, Türkiye established itself as a useful go-between for the main protagonists.

This helped cut Türkiye some slack with both the West and Russia. It was thus able to continue trading with Russia, within the limitations of the Western sanctions regime, trade that helped anchor its own macroeconomic position.

Remarkably, in parallel, Türkiye was able to supply critical military supplies to Ukraine, including Bayraktar TB2s, which were absolutely game-changing in helping Ukrainian forces repel the initial Russian assault on Kiev.

Geopolitical shifts

The war in Ukraine brought wider shifts in geopolitics, which Türkiye took full advantage of.

First, in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan took advantage of the fact that Russian forces were stretched in Ukraine to use their military and technological advantage to overwhelm Armenian forces in Karabakh. The war was a great advertisement for Turkish military technology - Turkish drones, particularly Bayraktar TB2, were instrumental in Azerbaijan’s victory.

But Turkish diplomacy also kept Russian forces on the sidelines. A final peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan appears close, and this will also bring a long-overdue normalisation in relations between Türkiye and Armenia.

The border between the two states is likely to open soon. This will help further boost Turkish trade and diplomatic ties into Central Asia, and through to China.

The success of Turkish military technology in wars in Ukraine and Karabakh has shown how hard power can open the way for soft power opportunities with countries in Africa, Europe and the Middle East now eager to partner with Türkiye, to help diversify their own defence relationships.

The fact that Russia was bogged down in Ukraine also played no small part in the fall of the Baath regime, as did Türkiye’s provision of key military technical support to anti-Assad forces.

Russia was stretched in Syria, and with Iran and Hezbollah weakened by Israeli attacks, Türkiye was able to support its allies in taking Damascus.

Syria’s emergence from sanctions and real hopes of recovery and reconstruction offer a potential boon for Turkish companies, given their strengths in manufacturing and construction.

An improving outlook for peace and recovery in Syria also offers the potential for political wins at home for Türkiye, leading to the disbandment and disarmament process of the PKK terror group. The latter, if delivered, would bring a huge economic stimulus and would help remove points of tension in relations with Europe.

As in Syria, any peace in Ukraine would bring big benefits to Türkiye, as its close strategic ties with Kiev should see it benefit through participation in reconstruction, which could amount to many tens of billions of dollars per year.

Any peace deal in Ukraine is unlikely to alleviate broader security concerns for Europe. And given the likely persistent and existential threat from Russia, and the weakening US backstop to European security, Europe will likely look to diversify defence and strategic partnerships.

On this score, Türkiye is likely to be the big winner, with its large and capable military and well-developed military industrial complex.

Global relations

Türkiye is open to partnership with Europe in defence and military technology, providing Europe with scale but in exchange for technology transfer. Already, we have seen some progress herein with the recent Baykar - Piaggio and Leonardo deals. More are likely to come.

But the security challenges for Europe, presented by the war in Ukraine, also present an opportunity for a return to the whole question of Türkiye’s position in Europe; its EU accession bid might be given new life by agreement on a new, deeper Customs Union arrangement.

Türkiye’s hard and soft power capabilities have also seen it take an active role in helping broker peace in the Middle East.

Ankara played a critical role as guarantor in the recent Gaza peace process. Important to the deal-making Trump, Türkiye showed a willingness to put skin in the game - offering troops to police any deal.

While the latter appears to have been blocked by Israel, by showing a positive and constructive approach to deliver peace, Türkiye has won friends in the White House. This is expected to reap rewards, perhaps with a deal to secure the lifting of sanctions on Türkiye and its return to the coveted F-35 programme.

This perception of Türkiye as a pragmatic broker of deals, fitting with the Trump narrative, but also as a serious purveyor of hard power and military technology, bringing improvements in relations across the wider region.

Relations with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are much improved - helped by a coordinated response on Gaza, and as a foil to Israel. Even relations with China are on an improving trend as trade and business ties are being prioritised and helping to set a new positive tone.

In summary, Türkiye has managed to turn a challenging set of geopolitical events to its advantage, and opportunities now knock for much improved foreign relations, and with it, economic outcomes.