Kazim AlamPresident Donald Trump is reportedly racing to settle the war with Iran before his May 14-15 summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.
That is because he views the ongoing Iran war as a threat to the negotiating leverage of the US on issues like trade, tariffs, and rare earths, experts say.
Originally planned for March but postponed because of the Iran war that began on February 28, the summit will be a test of the US’s negotiating strength at a moment when price shocks from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow waterway that Iran and Gulf nations use to ship out the bulk of their energy exports – have disrupted global markets.
Murat Oztuna, a China analyst at the Ankara-based Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), tells TRT World that Trump’s motivation to settle the war before May 15 reflects a “macroeconomic necessity”, not a choice.
“Trump’s desire to ‘contain’ the war with Iran before his summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing is based on strong strategic and numerical foundations,” he says.
The containment objective is rooted in his desire to control the summit agenda, manage domestic political pressure, and ensure flexibility in negotiation, he says.
“As the war continues, the US becomes the weaker party, not militarily, but in terms of economic and political leverage. The summit becomes a more reactive platform producing more limited results,” he says.
Far from being merely a security issue, the on-again, off-again Iran war has become a global economic shock transmitted through energy prices, inflation, and supply chain bottlenecks.
The energy dimension is the most concrete indicator of Trump’s macroeconomic necessity to settle the war, Oztuna says.
Roughly 20 percent of global oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, the war has caused a loss of more than 10 million barrels of oil per day, driving oil prices to a four-year high.
According to the World Bank, energy prices are projected to rise by 24 percent in 2026, the highest increase since 2022 when the Russia-Ukraine war started.
At the same time, global economic growth is expected to slow down to 2.5 percent in 2026, down from 3.2 percent a year ago.
These pressures are already visible in the US, where fuel prices have increased roughly 50 percent, pushing inflation above four percent, which is twice the Federal Reserve’s target.
Oztuna warns that a continuing war will erode US leverage in talks with China in four distinct ways.
One, high energy prices and inflationary pressures will make Washington reluctant to threaten or impose new tariffs on China – a negotiation tool that Trump has used rather freely to keep friends and foes in line since coming to power last year.
Two, the ongoing war will shift the summit’s agenda from trade and strategic competition to energy security and crisis management, turning the US into a “reactive crisis manager” rather than an agenda-setter, he says.
Three, a sustained focus on the Gulf region will make it difficult for Washington to harden its position on Taiwan, which will give Beijing a “timing advantage”.
Taiwan is an island state that China says is part of its territory, but Taipei rejects this claim. Even though the US has no formal ties with Taiwan, Washington is its biggest international backer and arms supplier.
China apparently wants Trump to change the US language to “we oppose Taiwan independence”, from the current one-China policy that takes no position on the island state’s sovereignty.
Four, in a world of strained global supply chains, China’s dominance in rare earth elements will become even more effective leverage, Oztuna says.
Rare earth elements have gained centrality in global supply chains as they power permanent magnets – metals that generate a magnetic field without electricity, thus making electric motors and precision weapons more efficient.
“As the conflict continues, China can include the Iran issue in the same bargaining package as trade, technology, and security issues. The US, in turn, is forced to demand at least ‘non-obstruction’ or limited cooperation from China on the Iran issue,” he says.
“This makes it more difficult for Washington to harden its stance in other areas,” Oztuna adds.
What does Xi want?
Ozan Ahmet Cetin, a non-resident research fellow at the Washington-based think tank SETA, agrees with the view that Trump is urgently seeking a resolution to the Iran war.
“Trump would clearly prefer to go into the Beijing summit with the Iran conflict either settled or at least stabilised,” he tells TRT World.
“If the war is still active, it narrows his diplomatic space. Instead of setting the agenda with Xi on trade, tariffs, Taiwan and rare earths, he risks spending much of the meeting managing a Middle East crisis,” he says.
From Beijing’s perspective, a lingering conflict actually strengthens Xi’s hand, at least in the short term, analysts say.
Oztuna notes that China imports more than 70 percent of its oil, with 45-50 percent of those imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran supplies Beijing with 1.3-1.4 million barrels a day, representing 80-90 percent of the Shia-majority nation’s exports. This makes China both vulnerable and indispensable: it’s Iran’s primary customer, sanctions bypass actor, and potential mediator, he says.
“Xi’s primary goal is to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, ensure continued oil flow, and keep energy prices under control,” Oztuna says.
“That is a low-intensity and manageable tension preferred over a complete solution,” he says.
China’s strategic oil reserves of 900 million to 1.4 billion barrels provide a six-month buffer, giving Beijing more patience than Washington.
Cetin agrees that the war continuing through the Beijing summit will give Xi more room to manoeuvre.
“It will not make China stronger in every respect, because China also suffers from energy disruption. But diplomatically, it will weaken Trump’s ability to dictate the agenda,” he says.
Beijing wants predictable access to the US market, fewer tariff shocks, limits on technology and investment restrictions, and a reframing of the relationship as one between equals.
A summit on Chinese soil, with Washington distracted by a full-fledged war in the Middle East, advances those Chinese goals.
How long can Iran sustain?
Analysts say Iran has an incentive to stretch the conflict into the summit window.
Oztuna describes it as a “short-term time-gaining strategy” to increase pressure on the US. It is aimed at forcing more flexible decisions on sanctions relief and the decoupling of maritime security from the nuclear issue.
Tehran loses roughly $175 million in daily oil revenue. It has seen exports fall up to 45 percent, with the economy expected to shrink by 10 percent, he says.
“Despite this, Iran's calculation is that time may work against the US because the other side is also under increased inflation and political pressure due to the energy shock,” he says.
Iran’s asymmetric tools – naval harassment, missiles, proxies – allow it to create volatility in global energy markets at a relatively low cost, he adds.
Cetin is of the same view that Iran may be inclined to stretch the war into the Trump-Xi summit window. Tehran knows that an unresolved Hormuz conflict will complicate Trump’s diplomacy in Beijing, he says.
“Tehran will hope that Washington, facing Chinese pressure, oil-market anxiety and shipping disruption, becomes more flexible on ceasefire terms,” he says.
However, both experts caution that sustaining the war beyond two weeks may prove too difficult for Tehran given its deep economic turmoil.
“Iran has not collapsed, but is rapidly coming under pressure. Therefore, (continuing the war) might be sustainable for two weeks, but challenging for several months,” Oztuna says.
