Trump keeps the Iran door open, and Netanyahu can’t close it

The Israeli premier arrived in the US seeking firm alignment against Tehran. Instead, he encountered a White House intent on testing diplomacy, exposing strategic differences that could shape the next phase of negotiations.

By Mohammad Al-Kassim
A protester holds up a placard as US President Trump meets Israeli PM Netanyahu at the White House in Washington. / Reuters

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned from Washington without the outcome he had clearly hoped for, or the outcome he had led his domestic audience to expect in the days before the trip.

The visit, hastily moved up by a week and framed by Netanyahu as urgent and decisive, ended with a brief, anodyne statement from his office. There was no joint appearance, no press conference, and no public declaration of alignment with President Donald Trump on Iran. 

When Netanyahu met with Trump at the White House on Wednesday, Iran was top of the Israeli PM’s agenda. And on his way back to Israel, Netanyahu said he had made his feelings clear – “not hide my general scepticism about the possibility of reaching any agreement with Iran”. 

For a leader who typically amplifies diplomatic achievements and personal rapport with American presidents — from his 2015 address to Congress opposing the Obama administration’s Iran deal to his close partnership with Trump during the Abraham Accords — the restraint was striking.

President Trump, for his part, said “nothing definitive” had been decided. 

The White House made clear that negotiations with Iran remain ongoing following the first exploratory round of US–Iran talks aimed at testing parameters for a possible new nuclear framework. 

That, in itself, was the headline Netanyahu had hoped to prevent.

A meeting defined by what didn’t happen

Netanyahu arrived in Washington, saying he would present Israel’s “guiding principles” for negotiations with Iran. 

But there was nothing fundamentally new in those principles — nor in the message he delivered.

For more than three decades, Netanyahu has framed Iran as an existential threat to Israel, warning of its nuclear ambitions in international forums, including at the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, where he famously drew a red line on a cartoon bomb.

His objectives have been consistent: weaken Iran by any means available; prefer regime change if possible; and, failing that, ensure Iran is permanently deprived of nuclear capabilities and long-range missiles.
After last year’s direct, unprovoked Israeli attack on Iran, missile capabilities have become even more central to Israel’s demands.

In Washington, Netanyahu pushed a maximalist position:

  • no uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, a demand that goes beyond previous US negotiating frameworks, including the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which permitted limited enrichment under strict monitoring;
  • strict limits — ideally elimination — of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, a core pillar of Tehran’s deterrence strategy and long considered non-negotiable by Iranian leadership;
  • constraints on Iran’s regional allies and proxy networks, and
  • Israeli freedom of action to strike Iran, even under any future agreement.

He also opposes any ‘sunset clause’ seeking permanent restrictions that would entrench Israel’s strategic dominance in the region.

None of this aligns with the trajectory of US–Iran diplomacy. 

While the Trump administration has yet to spell out the precise parameters of a potential agreement, early signals from Washington point to a more limited objective than Israel has been demanding. 

The focus appears to be on extending Iran’s nuclear breakout timeline and preventing weaponisation — rather than eliminating uranium enrichment altogether or dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

In effect, the White House seems to be testing whether an imperfect but enforceable deal is achievable before turning to escalation. 

That approach reflects a calculation that containing Iran’s nuclear advances, even partially, may be preferable to the risks of confrontation or military action.

At the same time, President Trump has sharpened his rhetoric. 

He reiterated his commitment to negotiations but paired it with a stark warning: if Iran fails to reach a nuclear deal with Washington, the outcome would be, in his words, “very traumatic”. 

For the first time, Trump also attached a timeframe to that ultimatum, suggesting that diplomacy has a limited window — roughly the next month — before consequences follow.

The message from Washington is deliberate ambiguity: diplomacy remains the preferred path, but the clock is now publicly ticking.

The timing of Netanyahu’s trip is critical. Netanyahu advanced the visit shortly after the first round of US–Iran talks, signalling urgency — and concern. 

Israeli officials feared momentum: that negotiations might move ahead before Israel could shape their parameters.

That fear appears well-founded. While Trump continues to issue rhetorical threats toward Iran, his actions suggest a preference for testing diplomacy before escalating militarily. 

Domestic pressures and political stakes

Netanyahu’s urgency is also driven by domestic considerations. 

His governing coalition faces mounting pressures, including disputes over military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox parties, budget constraints linked to prolonged wartime expenditures, and ongoing public dissatisfaction following the October 7 attacks and subsequent regional escalation. 

A dramatic confrontation with Iran — or even the perception that he is leading one — would be politically transformative.

Iran remains one of the few issues in Israel that still commands near-consensus across coalition and opposition lines. 

Netanyahu knows that. He has long positioned himself as the indispensable guardian against Tehran, and he needs to show Israeli voters that Washington remains closely aligned with him.

That explains the repeated emphasis, aimed at domestic audiences, on “coordination” with the US — even when public evidence of such coordination is thin.

According to Israeli assessments, Netanyahu brought intelligence to Washington intended to cast doubt on Iran’s intentions, including claims that Tehran is stalling negotiations, continuing executions, and refusing to engage seriously on missiles.

But if this intelligence was meant to derail diplomacy, it appears not to have succeeded.

Trump’s team — including Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Marco Rubio, and others — listened. 

But the White House has not embraced Israel’s conclusion that negotiations are futile. 

Instead, it appears determined to test whether a deal is possible, even if imperfect. That leaves Israel preparing for an alternative outcome.

The prevailing assessment in Israel is that talks may ultimately fail — either because Iranian demands prove incompatible with US red lines, or because Israel’s demands make an agreement politically or technically impossible. 

That is precisely why Netanyahu insists on keeping the military option alive.

Behind closed doors, the three-hour meeting likely went beyond negotiating positions to contingency planning: what happens if talks collapse, how far Israel can act independently, and what level of US support or tolerance it might expect.

Israel’s core demand remains unchanged: freedom of action.

Despite public expressions of unity, Netanyahu and Trump are approaching Iran from different strategic premises. 

Trump appears to value flexibility and leverage, using the prospect of force to extract concessions while keeping diplomatic channels open. 

Netanyahu seeks permanence: structural constraints that prevent Iran from re-emerging as a threshold nuclear power under any future political configuration.

What binds them — at least for now — is political self-interest. Both prefer to avoid public confrontation. Both face domestic calculations. And both understand the risks of escalation.

For Netanyahu, however, the Washington visit underscored an uncomfortable reality: Israel can influence US policy, but it does not control it.

Diplomacy is moving forward — whether Israel likes it or not.