Analysis: Why Israel’s new military chief could push region into wider war

The appointment of Eyal Zamir as Israel’s new Chief of General Staff potentially marks a pivotal shift in Tel Aviv’s strategic priorities and also signals a fundamental course change in its military strategy in the region—from asymmetric, low-intensity conflicts to large-scale ground warfare.

Zamir, the former Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Defence, replaces Herzi Halevi, who resigned after admitting responsibility for the military and intelligence failure over the October 7 operation led by Hamas.

Under normal circumstances, a new Chief of General Staff might not be of major political significance.

Yet, in Israel, such appointments are highly scrutinised, not only because of the military’s deep entanglement with politics but also because many former army chiefs, including Ehud Barak, Benny Gantz, and Gadi Eisenkot, have seamlessly transitioned into political careers.

Beyond the political implications, Zamir’s appointment is ostensibly an attempt to obscure Israel’s failures on October 7 while simultaneously preparing for more aggressive, conventional military offensives in the region.

During the Gaza war, Zamir was a key architect of Israel’s military escalation, pushing for prolonged ground invasions over airstrikes.

Before that, as Southern Command chief (2015–2018), he oversaw intensified military assaults on the enclave Gaza, including airstrikes and violent crackdowns on Palestinians’ border protests.

He has also bolstered Israel’s war machine, securing weapons deals and expanding local arms production as a “well-known” figure in the industry.

Zamir’s appointment comes at a pivotal moment—not only amid a fragile ceasefire in Gaza but also against the backdrop of escalating Israeli military aggression in the occupied West Bank.

While Israel systematically undermines ceasefire efforts by introducing new demands at every critical stage, it has also intensified deadly raids in Jenin, Nablus, and other Palestinian cities, killing dozens.

Political background

Zamir’s family settled in Palestine during the British Mandate in the 1920s after migrating from Yemen. His grandfather, Aharon, was a member of the Irgun—a Zionist organisation responsible for terror attacks against both British forces and Palestinian civilians.

Decades later, Eyal Zamir found himself serving under the political successors of the Irgun terror organisation, which later evolved into the Likud party, which was in power when Zamir was appointed military secretary to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from 2012 to 2015.

His repeated nominations for the Chief of General Staff position in 2018 and 2022 were blocked, reportedly due to his reputation as “Netanyahu’s man”—a label that made him unpopular within Israel’s military establishment, which has often had a complicated relationship with the prime minister.

However, beyond his political affiliations, Zamir’s appointment is significant for another reason: his military background marks a shift in Israel’s strategic priorities.

For nearly half a century—except for Dan Halutz, who came from the air forces—all Israeli chiefs of general staff have been drawn from either the paratroopers or special forces.

Zamir, by contrast, comes from the armoured corps. The last Israeli military chief with a similar background was David Elazar, who resigned in disgrace following Israel’s failures in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

A military hardliner

Zamir’s doctrine signals a fundamental shift in Israel’s military strategy—from asymmetric, low-intensity conflicts to large-scale ground warfare.

His emphasis on armoured divisions and reduced reliance on air power is seen not just as a tactical adjustment but a strategic realignment, preparing the army for prolonged, high-intensity battles across the region.

He was one of the commanders of the “retraining” courses of the top echelon following the humiliating failures of the 2006 Lebanon War, which exposed Israeli weaknesses in ground warfare. The lessons from that war appear to have shaped his views on military preparedness—prioritising armoured divisions and direct ground confrontations.

During the 2010s, Zamir supported then-defence minister Avigdor Lieberman’s proposal to establish a “missile force” unit in the army and opposed the reduction of the tank force, along with the closure of the combat helicopter squadron.

Even before officially assuming his new role, he presented a military expansion plan while competing against Herzi Halevi for the Chief of Staff position three years ago.

This plan—submitted to Netanyahu and others—warned against reducing manpower, signalling his commitment to a larger and more aggressive military apparatus.

Zamir considers himself a reformer, but his version of “reform” means further entrenching Israel’s militaristic policies. His urgency is largely driven by the severe losses Israel has suffered since October 7.

According to official figures, about 15 percent of Israel’s 840 plus killed soldiers came from the armoured corps—second only to the infantry.

Israel has not suffered such armored unit losses since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Egyptian and Syrian forces used advanced anti-tank missiles to decimate Israeli tank divisions.

However, that war was fought between conventional armies. Today, Israel is losing tanks and crews in urban warfare against non-state actors—an even greater embarrassment.

A recent tank procurement deal serves as an acknowledgement of this failure. Instead of reassessing its military doctrine, Israel is doubling down on heavy firepower.

More escalation ahead?

In his first speech after his appointment, Zamir declared 2025 as a 'year of war'—a statement that not only signals escalating aggression against Palestinians but also hints at Israel’s broader regional ambitions.

His emphasis on military self-sufficiency suggests preparation for prolonged conflicts beyond Gaza, potentially extending to Lebanon, Syria, or even Iran. This also marks a strategic move to ensure that Israel can wage wars without relying on Western approval or supplies.

Beyond battlefield strategy, Zamir is a vocal supporter of collective punishment against Palestinians. Like former defence minister Yoav Gallant and former national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir, he openly advocates for depriving Palestinians of essential resources—declaring that there should be “no water, no electricity, no food”.

Given his hardline stance, Israel’s blockades, restrictions, and indiscriminate military campaigns are expected to intensify under his leadership.

But this shift could also carry risks. A more aggressive Israeli military, unrestrained by Western diplomacy, will not only escalate tensions in Gaza and the occupied West Bank but could also provoke a broader regional war—with Lebanon, Syria, and even Iran.

In this new era of Israeli militarism, the question is no longer whether another war is coming but how far it will go.