‘Israel never wanted a Palestinian state’ - insider’s view of Oslo Process

It is fashionable to lambast the Oslo process and to point out its shortcomings, particularly with the collapse of the two-state solution and the entrenchment of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

Many people have argued that this failure was inevitable and that Israel never negotiated in good faith, and never considered the possibility of a Palestinian State, which was the promise held out by the Oslo process.

The Oslo Process was sold to the Palestinians and the world as a process that would lead to a two-state solution and allow the gradual rise of an independent Palestinian State.

As someone who was involved in the negotiations, as head of the Legal Committee negotiating the basic document labeled Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO signed in 1994, I can testify that there was indeed excitement all around. The process broke many taboos and it seemed to hold so much promise for a mutually acceptable negotiated outcome.

Yet even at that time, I could sense, and I said that the process could easily go in one of two ways: It could lead to an independent Palestinian state in the areas occupied in 1967, or it could lead to a permanent fortified occupation, this time with Palestinian consent and collaboration. Sadly, it led to the latter possibility.

To be sure Oslo was only an “Interim Agreement”. It was deliberately crafted as an ongoing process with gradual, carefully monitored steps expanding the scope, geographic reach and powers of the Palestinian National Authority as it took on more and more territory and responsibilities.

This process was intended to lead eventually to a permanent peace agreement to be negotiated starting within the first two years, and concluded no later than 5 years after the signing of the Cairo Agreement in 1994.

The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin led to the election and rise of Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Likud Party who never really accepted the Oslo process to begin with.

Yet the seeds for the failure of the process were already laid from the very beginning, and perhaps, the whole process was a grand deception as Israel never truly intended to allow the creation of a Palestinian state in the first place.

Structurally, there were three main reasons why the Oslo Process failed, and perhaps was intended to fail all along.

The missing points

The process deliberately left the five most controversial and difficult issues to be negotiated later, as part of the permanent status negotiations including the status of Jerusalem, the question of refugees, settlements, borders, and security arrangements.

Yet the Oslo Agreement never even hinted at what would happen if no agreement was reached on one or more of these crucial issues.

It stated clearly that the process itself was to be the only method for resolving issues between Israel and the Palestinians, yet it did not provide any guidance as to what would happen if there was no agreement.

From Israel's point of view, it apparently meant that the status quo would continue and that the facts on the ground now obtained a legitimacy of their own with Palestinian approval, as Palestinians could not do anything to change the existing reality having been trapped in the Oslo Process and contractually detached from International law, or international bodies.

No obligations

The process had no mechanism for enforcing the obligations of the parties under its own terms, and no sanctions for violating its provisions.

Israel still had a variety of levers and powers on the ground to “punish” the Palestinians if they violated the Agreement, or indeed if they did anything it did not like.

They had control on the ground and of the borders. They controlled monies they collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. They had veto power in the “joint committees” that regulated all things of interest to the Palestinians, while having exclusive power over things that were of interest to them and their settlers. They could insist (and they did) that Palestinians carry out meticulously all their obligations under the Oslo Agreement, yet they could unilaterally violate any of their obligations, with no consequences.

Examples of this included such vital matters as “safe passage” between Gaza and the occupied West Bank, the requirement to allow Gaza fishing within 12 miles of the coast, transferring additional powers and geographic areas from Israeli to Palestinian control (by changing its designation from Area C to Area A and B), as well as strengthening the Palestinian institutions in occupied East Jerusalem, and refraining from unilateral actions that would prejudice the final status of the occupied territories. All of these were promised and agreed to in writing.

The illegal settlements

Most importantly, there was no provision for freezing of settlement or settlement activities. Instead, the settlements grew rapidly in size, area and structures.

An entire elaborate system was rapidly created by the Israelis that totally undermined any possibility of an independent Palestinian state.

The number of settlers, and areas under their control increased dramatically, and a system of roads was created linking settlements together and to the state of Israel, and administrative and legal structures were created essentially annexing all of Area C (60 percent of the occupied West Bank) into Israel. That alone ensured the collapse of the Oslo Process.

In the end, the Oslo process, from the point of view of those who thought it would lead to the end of occupation and to a two-state solution, has failed miserably.

For those who never intended these outcomes, and only needed an excuse to continue the occupation, and make it permanent, with Palestinian collaboration, it has succeeded beyond all expectations.