Aleppo, Mosul, Mogadishu: Is Gaza's urban war comparable to other battles?

In Vietnam's Hue in 1968 and Iraq's Fallujah in 2004, the US won urban battles at the expense of enormous civilian casualties, which led to its eventual defeat and withdrawal.

Israeli attacks on Gaza led to many civilian casualties as Palestinian resistance fighters and Israeli forces have fought pitched battles in an urban warfare setting. Photo: Reuters
Reuters

Israeli attacks on Gaza led to many civilian casualties as Palestinian resistance fighters and Israeli forces have fought pitched battles in an urban warfare setting. Photo: Reuters

Israel's brutal war on Gaza has entered the third month amid relentless and indiscriminate bombing of the blockaded enclave that has killed more than 16,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children.

After a week-long ceasefire in late November through a hostage release deal, Israel has resumed airstrikes and ground offensive in southern Gaza, where most Palestinians are seeking shelter. It is also the area where Hamas fighters are believed to be entrenched as it is the only part of the besieged enclave not under Zionist control till now.

Experts are assessing the fierce urban fighting in this area, which is now home to more than one million people.

Pentagon Chief Lloyd Austin recently warned his Israeli counterpart that if the urban warfare continues to result in large civilian casualties, Tel Aviv risks facing "a strategic defeat" in the long term, even though it might claim "a tactical victory" in Gaza.

Experts in modern warfare are drawing parallels between the urban warfare in Gaza and similar battlefronts in other cities since World War II, pointing out how the US lost popular support despite winning the battles.

Compared to Gaza, "no other city has had such a complex battle space: Aleppo, Mosul, Hue, Mogadishu, Aachen, Berlin, Stalingrad," says Edward Erickson, a former American military officer and a retired professor of military history at the Department of War Studies at the Marine Corps University.

Among these battlefields – spread across the Middle East to Africa, Europe, and Russia – the 1968 battle in the Vietnamese city of Hue makes a strong case of how brutal tactics aimed to force enemies to capitulate might lead to a strategic failure at the end.

Others

A US 1st Air Cavalry Division soldier throws a rice basket into flames after a peasant woman retrieved it from the burning house in background. American troops destroyed everything of value to the enemy after overrunning the village near Tam Ky, 350 miles northeast of Saigon, during the Vietnam War on Oct. 27, 1967. (AP Photo/Dang Van Phuoc)

"The 1968 Battle of Hue stands as a stark representation of how tactical manoeuvres can have profound strategic implications in urban warfare," wrote Carlo J.V. Caro, a political and military analyst.

Hue had Vietnam's third biggest population, with 140,000 civilians alongside an estimated force of 7,500 fighters from the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong, a pro-communist movement in then-South Vietnam against the US intervention.

The US Army defeated its Vietnamese enemies in the infamous Battle of Hue, regaining control at the expense of destroying 80 percent of the city, whose 116,000 residents were forced to leave their hometown.

This US conduct of urban warfare essentially "eroded South Vietnamese and American political support for the war," according to Caro. "This demonstrates a critical challenge in urban warfare: one can win the battle but lose the broader conflict."

In Iraq's Fallujah, a similar story played out in 2016. While US forces captured the city after heavy street fighting with local groups, the disproportionately high number of civilian casualties led local populations to shift their support toward anti-American armed groups.

The lack of popular support and increasing American casualties played a crucial role in the eventual US withdrawal from Iraq.

Others

Residents of Fallujah, Iraq look into a bullet riddled car on April 29, 2003 outside a school where US soldiers fired on demonstrators the night before. US soldiers opened fire on Iraqis at a nighttime demonstration against the American presence in the region after people shot at them with automatic rifles, soldiers said. (AP Photo/Ali Haider)

Shifting alliances

Experts believe that, like the South Vietnamese and Iraqis, many Palestinians who have witnessed their homes destroyed and their loved ones killed and injured might lend more support to Hamas, making the Palestinian resistance group more powerful and resilient.

Israel's indiscriminate targeting of Palestinians and failure to avoid civilian casualties might "drive" many more Palestinians into supporting Hamas, which will eventually translate into a strategic defeat for Tel Aviv, according to Austin. Also, Israel's unverified claims against Hamas might increase international support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel.

Two weeks ago, the Israelis were directing their firepower on the Shifa Hospital, claiming that Hamas' headquarters are located in the facility. But it later proved to be a case of false intel.

"Hamas knows that in an insurgency, they do not have to destroy Israeli forces. They only need to survive. Hamas wins by surviving," says Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst on armed groups at International Crisis Group, an American think-tank. If Hamas and its allies survive the ongoing fighting, it will not be an ultimate Israeli victory, he says.

Drevon also questions the validity of the dominant official Western rhetoric, which equates Hamas with Daesh. Hamas has emerged from the Palestinian population, unlike Daesh, which was a multinational terrorist group imposing itself on both Syrian and Iraqi populations, he tells TRT World.

Hamas has led the Palestinian enclave since 2007 after winning the last election in 2006. They are also able to provide different social services to the Gaza population.

Tunnel warfare

Experts believe that the current urban warfare will be decided in the complex network of Gaza's tunnels. Hamas fighters will be positioned in their tunnels to fight Israeli forces rather than facing them in direct combat, according to Drevon.

Others

A Palestinian communicates with others on the other side of a tunnel used to import goods from Egypt to the Gaza Strip in Rafah refugee camp, southern Gaza Strip in 2008. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

"Tunnel warfare is ancient, but it is no easier today than 2,000 years ago. In particular, radios and cell phones don't work well underground, adversely affecting communications. It is very easy for attackers to be cut off and isolated. It's terribly dangerous to attack in an enemy tunnel complex," Erickson tells TRT World.

According to experts, urban warfare is already the most difficult form of armed campaign.

In Gaza, with the involvement of tunnel systems, which create a unique combat environment, it will be even much harder, says Erickson. Like other experts, Erickson predicts that the Israeli army will try to go ahead with a plan to flood the tunnels with seawater.

"Previously, the battle space in spatial characteristics was horizontal and vertically upward. Now, the battle space goes vertically up and vertically down. Consequently, the potential battle space is much larger," he views.

"This makes 'clear and hold' difficult because the enemy can 'pop up' out of a tunnel in an area that you believed you had already cleared of enemy fighters. The IDF [Israeli army], in turn, must commit much larger forces than in previous urban combat environments."

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