Will Shehbaz Sharif’s new government be any different from his last one?

Once again, a coalition is coming together to govern over Pakistan, which is facing a serious economic crisis.

Shehbaz Sharif is the younger brother of Pakistan's former three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif. / Photo: Reuters Archive
Reuters Archive

Shehbaz Sharif is the younger brother of Pakistan's former three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif. / Photo: Reuters Archive

The coalition of parties that formed government in Pakistan for 16 months after ousting former premier Imran Khan through a parliamentary vote of no confidence in April 2022 is expected to be back in power soon.

No single party won more than 50 percent of parliamentary seats in the February 8 general election, which has been marred by allegations of rigging.

As a result, the same coalition of parties has once again aligned itself against the independent candidates backed by Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which won the highest number of seats in the national legislature.

The coalition, established as the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) in its previous 16-month stint in power, has renominated Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) for the prime minister’s office.

Many analysts have said the incoming administration of Shehbaz, who’s the younger brother of three-time premier Nawaz Sharif, will be a replay of his 2022-23 government, which included the assassinated prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Even though he earned the reputation of a goal-oriented, stern administrator during his three terms of varying lengths as chief minister of Punjab, the largest of Pakistan’s four provinces, Shehbaz’s performance as prime minister in 2022-23 remained less than stellar.

His government saw the longest spell of high inflation, record-breaking interest rates, import restrictions, removal of subsidies on electricity consumers, and power struggle among top-tier party leaders in full public view.

Others, however, say the incoming dispensation will not be the incarnation of the earlier PDM government. Ground realities have changed since August 2023, and Shehbaz is likely to be a more assertive and decisive prime minister this time around, they say.

“It won’t be a repeat of the last Shehbaz government. In the previous setup, the PPP played a big and crucial role in the cabinet,” says Fahd Husain, political analyst and president of Aik News network.

PPP is now controlled by Benazir’s son, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, and it emerged as the third biggest winner of seats in the general election.

Even though the PPP has formally joined the Shehbaz-led coalition, it’s so far shied away from accepting cabinet positions. Instead, it seems to have settled for constitutional positions like president, provincial governors and chairman of the upper house of parliament.

“Decision-making in the previous cabinet would always have major input from the PPP. Only the PML-N will now have the dominant role in decision-making, which should count as the biggest difference from the old setup,” says Husain.

PPP held key ministries like foreign affairs, commerce, health, industries, and privatisation in the Shehbaz cabinet of 2022-23 which was arguably the largest in Pakistan’s parliamentary history.

Another differentiating factor in the incoming administration will be that coalition partners will also lead three of the four provincial governments, says Husain.

Most importantly, Shehbaz’s PML-N will be in power in Punjab which, as the largest and richest federating unit, will lend political strength to the federal government, he says.

“The last PML-N-led government in Islamabad had too many pulls and pushes because the party didn’t control any provincial government at the time.”

Analysts say one of the worst mistakes that Shehbaz made during his brief time as premier was appointing Ishaq Dar as finance minister.

At first, he appointed Miftah Ismail, a PhD in economics from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, as finance czar who successfully revived a stalled International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme to save the country from imminent default.

But five months into the job, Shehbaz let Ismail go and installed Dar – a relative and four-time finance minister known for his hawkish stance on managing the rupee-dollar exchange rate – as finance minister. Ismail later accused Dar of undermining him to get the coveted ministry.

The exchange rate continued to see wild swings in 2022-23 while the new finance minister publicly accused the IMF of pursuing a political agenda. Shehbaz had to intervene at last and secure new IMF funding under a fresh loan programme.

Dar is once again a contender for the finance minister’s slot. Experts have warned Shehbaz that reappointing Dar as finance minister will be “disastrous” for his second term as prime minister.

Military in driving seat

Husain of Aik News says Shehbaz developed a sound working relationship with military chief General Asim Munir during his premiership in 2022-23. The fact that the army chief sits on the newly formed Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) – a powerful body set up to “avoid complex business processes and inordinate delays” – will make it easier for Shehbaz to manage economic affairs, he says.

Civilian governments in Pakistan have traditionally relied on military leadership to ensure their survival and political stability. All prime ministers in the nation’s 76 years of existence had to bow out before the end of their five-year constitutional terms once they developed differences with the military establishment.

Speaking to TRT World, Boston University Professor of International Relations Adil Najam says the incoming administration will look more like the PTI government that came to power after the 2018 general election.

Najam says that Khan also formed a minority government in 2018 with the support of the establishment. “The only big difference is that the establishment was much stronger then than it is today,” he says.

Pakistan is expected to sign up for yet another loan of $6 billion with the IMF in the short term to help prop up its dwindling foreign exchange reserves that currently hover around $8 billion. In contrast, only the external debt repayments falling due in the fiscal year beginning this July amount to roughly $25 billion.

Meanwhile, the economy continues to suffer low growth and persistently high inflation. The central bank expects GDP to grow between two to three percent in the current fiscal year, which is acutely insufficient to absorb the two million young people who join the national labour force every year.

“The fundamental issue is economic and political fragility. Cosmetic measures like SIFC can’t fix long-term structural problems,” he says.

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