Israel’s airstrike in Syria risks igniting a tinderbox in the Middle East

Israel’s recent airstrike outside Damascus resulted in the death of Sayyed Razi Mousavi, a senior advisor for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The subsequent outcry, denunciation and castigation of the strike from Tehran demonstrates the gravity of the attack and how it is perceived in Iran.

The strike follows a barrage of similar incursions into neighbouring Lebanon and Syria from Israeli forces since its war on Gaza commenced in October. The most recent strike has cast a spotlight on the tenuous security situation in the wider Middle East.

With confrontations between Israeli forces and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon becoming more pronounced, this strike on one of the oldest advisers of the IRGC in Syria risks augmenting the Iranian proxy warfare threat in the region and sets a dangerous precedent for peace and stability.

The reasons are many. Firstly, Mousavi’s status in the IRGC was robust. He was responsible for coordinating the longstanding military alliance between President Bashar al Assad’s regime in Damascus and Ebrahim Raisi’s government in Tehran, which is precisely what has angered Iran.

Some even considered him to be akin to a second Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in the IRGC who was killed by the US in 2020.

In Tehran, news of Mousavi’s death caused news transmissions on state television to be interrupted, with Mousavi being hailed as the Revolutionary Guard’s oldest advisors in Syria. Furthermore, Iran’s ambassador to Syria Hossein Akbari condemned the attack, saying that Mousavi was a diplomat who was performing his regular duties and was killed after returning from work.

Israeli defence forces have not commented on Mousavi’s killing, except to say, “the Israeli military obviously has a job to protect the security interests of Israel.”

How will this strike inflame tensions in the Middle East? One just needs to examine events which have taken place after the killing of Mousavi in Syria. On Wednesday, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which consists of a loose alliance of Tehran-backed Shia militias, claimed an attack on the Eliad settlement in the Golan Heights.

The drone attack carrying explosives which crashed in Eliad was also confirmed by the Israeli army. This followed a funeral session held for Mousavi in the cities of Najaf and Karbala. The same day, drone attacks from Lebanon were intercepted by the Israeli military in the Krayot area of northern Israel.

Meanwhile, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels witnessed the United States Treasury Department imposing sanctions on a group of money exchange services that it claims helped Iran transfer millions of dollars to them over attacks on vessels in the Red Sea.

Alongside the stepping up of Iranian-backed militia activity, the statements from Iran on the Mousavi killing are sharply different from its response to the killing of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 in a US-led airstrike.

Back then, former President Donald Trump’s administration initiated a unilateral strike in the absence of war in Gaza. Public anger came in the form of mass domestic protests directed at the United States amid scenes of mourning across Iran.

Things are different in 2023, however. The conflict in Gaza is no longer localised, as Syria and Iraq have been at the receiving end of Israeli airstrikes and bombardments. According to Iranian-Canadian political analyst Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran is not expected to be a silent bystander on Gaza with statements indicating active involvement in case the conflict intensifies.

The strike in Syria that killed Mousavi provides further justification for Tehran to follow through with its rhetoric due to two core reasons. First, Syria’s ironclad ties with Tehran and the diplomatic isolation of Syria by the West provides Iran with an opportunity to openly back Assad and call for greater influence of Islamic “liberation movements” across the region.

Second, through its Lebanese proxy group Hezbollah, Iran will seek to project itself as a regional power capable of countering Israel on all fronts.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s involvement in the Gaza war stems from the reckless cross-border firing into southern Lebanon by Israeli forces. Further action will depend on factors such as retaining Hezbollah’s domestic prestige and popular support in the country and beyond.

Evidence of an added incentive to maintain low-level conflict with Israel comes in the form of a statement issued just hours after the Damascus strike by Hezbollah, which considered the act a flagrant violation of Syria’s borders. Mousavi was lauded as a strategic partner of Hezbollah.

This response from Hezbollah fits into Iran’s security strategy which was already laid out by officials in 2023. It involves engaging with Hezbollah to pursue limited strikes on American and Israeli targets without directly drawing Iran into the conflict.

Hezbollah’s historical footprint in countries such as Syria and Lebanon have also been documented extensively in RAND’s 2023 report Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition, which mentions providing advanced capabilities to militias in Iraq and Yemen and providing advanced weapon systems to Lebanon.

The assassination of Mousavi only adds to Iran’s existing operations and lends further credence to earlier remarks by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Amirabdollahian that “anything is possible” when it comes to Tehran entering the Gaza Israel conflict.

The spike in provision of weapons, an emboldened Hezbollah and a defiant Iranian regime signifies that Israel has clearly expanded the theatre of war. Benny Gantz, a senior Israeli minister in Netanyahu’s war cabinet, has also hinted at the possibility of military escalation with the armed group, Hezbollah.

While Iran’s direct involvement can be ruled out due to variables such as Iran-Saudi rapprochement, fear of Western sanctions and international isolation, the expansion of Iran’s proxy warfare footprint through militias such as the Islamic Resistance of Iraq and Hezbollah is due to Israeli recklessness in Syria. It is a reality that the Middle East has to contend with.